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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores strategically viable options for dealing with the Iraq conflict 
with a new perspective on the dynamics of insurgency in Iraq and basic guidelines for an 
unconventional counterinsurgency effort. In introduction, the thesis presents an overview 
of the Iraq situation, describing the actors in the conflict, their political objectives, and 
the consequences of their actions. The thesis explores the theoretical concepts of the 
Mystic Diamond model developed by Gordon McCormick, which identifies the 
component variables of insurgencies and the dynamics of conflict between the state and 
counter-state. The thesis uses the Mystic Diamond model to interpret the Iraqi situation 
and explores steps for implementing an unconventional strategy in Iraq, including the 
skill sets that would be needed by unconventional forces tasked to carry out the proposed 
strategy. The conclusion emphasizes that the coalition forces have used a conventional 
strategy to stabilize a totally unconventional and increasingly uncontrollable 
environment. Political and military leaders are advised to consider the benefits of an 
unconventional approach when dealing with a counterinsurgency environment.  
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I.  THE SECOND WAR AGAINST IRAQ: FROM TOTAL 
SUCCESS TO POTENTIAL FAILURE  
A.  INTRODUCTION  
The 2003 war against Iraq has become one of the new century's most powerful 
controversies. The so-called “second Gulf War” split the world into opposing sides.1 The 
split of world opinion treats human controversy in terms of categorical oppositions like 
“us versus them.”2 The war against Iraq has been advocated, prepared for, developed, and 
sustained within a tsunami of pros and cons, a storm of ideas that affects strategic 
implementation and the articulation of the war's strategic objective. The debate shapes the 
future of Iraq; disagreements are evident there today in the Iraqis' lack of political 
consensus and national reconciliation. Iraq is becoming an anarchic environment, a 
situation with enormous negative consequences, in humanitarian terms, for the Middle 
East and perhaps beyond.  
From the beginning, the Iraq war was considered a problem with global 
significance, but its significance has been interpreted differently, and in many cases 
inconsistently or superficially, by the world's political and military leaders. International 
controversy and increasing evidence of political and military breakdown threaten the 
legitimacy of the war, and a positive end in the near future seems unlikely.  
B.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The intention of this thesis is not to criticize past and present political and military 
decisions, but to explore other strategically viable options for the Iraq conflict. There is a 
window of opportunity for any proposed solution, a time frame in which it would likely 
be most effective. A solution should also allow the theoretical concepts be confirmed or 
                                                 
1 “The U.S. Road to War,” (New York: Monitoring Policy Making at the United Nations, Global 
Forum Policy), available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/roadindex.htm, accessed 2 
April 2007. 
2 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2003). 
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verified in their confrontation with the harsh reality. Because the Iraq conflict involves a 
myriad of variables, a theoretical concept cannot be verified unless it is actually 
implemented. Although the correctness of a particular concept or strategic approach can 
be proven in theory, it is more important that the concept be efficiently implemented on 
the ground. 
The goal of this thesis is to examine a select portion of the ideas and variables 
involved in the Iraq war. The thesis begins, first, by describing the current Iraq situation, 
including a brief overview of the actors in the conflict, their political objectives, and the 
consequences of their actions. Second, the thesis explores, at the theoretical level, the 
concepts presented in the “Mystic Diamond” model developed by Gordon McCormick. 
Third, the thesis identifies relevant variables in contemporary Iraq and explains them 
through the lens of the Mystic Diamond model. Finally, the thesis describes appropriate 
steps for implementing an unconventional strategy in Iraq, including the package of 
forces necessary to carry out the relevant tasks. 
The conclusions emphasize the fact that so far, the coalition forces have used a 
conventional strategy to stabilize a totally unconventional environment which every day 
becomes harder to control. The thesis suggests that it is best to consider the benefits of an 
unconventional approach when dealing with a counterinsurgency environment. 
Assessment of the Iraq situation as a case study is based on the internationally recognized 
and accepted aims to stabilize, secure, reorganize and reconstruct Iraq as a successful 
example of democratization in the Middle East.  
When describing the current situation in Iraq, several questions appear critical. 
Who are the actors involved and what are their political objectives? What has been done 
right and what has been done wrong? What are the main obstacles to stabilizing Iraq? 
What is the most feasible design, operationally and strategically, for an unconventional 
strategy in Iraq? What are the main issues and obstacles to an unconventional strategy in 
this case? These and other relevant questions are considered to support the conclusions of 
the thesis.  
 3
It is important to note that some analysts believe the situation in Iraq should be 
characterized as an internal ethnic or sectarian insurgency or even a civil war which 
cannot be contained or solved in the light of the current strategy. For example, Ahmed 
Hashim writes,  
The situation in Iraq might be called a low intensity, localized and 
decentralized insurgency, with a large number of decentralized insurgent 
groups engaging in violence to disrupt and remove the U.S./Coalition 
Forces presence.3 
The authors of this thesis acknowledge the complexity, instability and insecurity 
of the situation in Iraq, and have selected the elements and issues most amenable to 
analysis with the chosen model. 
C.  EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONDITIONS PRECEDING THE WAR 
Analyzing the background of the “second Gulf War” implicitly recognizes that 
today’s problems are rooted in the past. The current complex environment developed 
gradually as a result of the first Gulf War, which was followed by the Saddam regime’s 
massive retaliation against newly emerging resistance forces in Kurdish and Shia areas.4  
Lacking time and space to review all the causes of the second Iraq war, this thesis 
begins by analyzing the Iraqi situation strategically and in terms of its implementation 
phases, starting with the first successful military campaign in 2003. The initial military 
campaign was followed by a dangerous situation which resulted in a series of 
miscalculations, inappropriate reactions and lack of coordination between political and 
military leaders. The chronologic events can be characterized starting with a vacuum of 
political power which fueled the resistance movement. The unstable environment allowed 
a later transition from resistance movement into insurgency. This insurgency degenerated 
into an acute sectarian clash and power struggle between different groups within Iraq. In 
                                                 
3 Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 
12. 
4 “The U.S. Road to War,” (New York: Monitoring Policy making at the United Nations, Global 
Forum Policy), available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/roadindex.htm, accessed 2 
April 2007. 
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brief, the vacuum of power created by the coalition forces' campaign precipitated an 
unpredictable reaction from traditional and emerging internal political forces. 
The military campaign was planned and conducted in accordance with the 
revolutionary concept of Effects Based Operations (EBO), a concept originating with the 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.5 The 
campaign began on March 20, 2003, and concluded successfully on April 9, 2003, when 
the U.S. forces entered Baghdad. The country was rapidly conquered, Saddam’s 
autocratic regime dissolved, and the Iraqi people were freed from the oppression of a 
dictatorial and odious leader.  
At the time, many hoped that Iraq's future would be based on freedom and 
democratic values. For part of the world, the victory was seen as significant because it 
ended Iraq's aggressive expansionist posture, eliminated an unpredictable military power, 
and destroyed a regime allegedly linked to international terrorism.  
Not many doubt the overwhelming and successful U.S. military campaign. 
Innovative thinking and brilliant operational management are the main characteristics of 
the military success. It is now clear, however, that the military believed that once the 
campaign was finished, the Department of State (DOS) would step in to conduct 
reconstruction and the army would play only a limited role. The reality was totally 
different. Today, the U.S. military commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, is 
perhaps the most important man in the country, as his decisions directly affect all aspects 
of the Iraqi environment. 
Many unexpected problems have emerged after the initial victory with the fall of 
Baghdad, when the overall strategy had to be recalibrated and new policies adopted in 
order to complete the general implementation plan. There were many obvious needs: to 
reinforce and maintain the stability and security of the country and to further rebuild and  
 
 
                                                 
5 David Pendall, Effects Based Operations and the Exercise of the National Power, Military Review, 
(National Security Agency, Fort Meade, MD, January - February 2004), available from 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/ebo/national-power.pdf, accessed 1 April 2007. 
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democratize Iraq. It was expected that policies would be implemented by intelligent 
professionals bringing with them a variety of economic and financial resources, all with 
ongoing military support.  
The job should have been completed through the cooperative involvement of two 
U.S. departments, with the DOS taking the primary role after the fall of Baghdad while 
the Department of Defense (DOD) assured a safe environment.6 The lead in 
implementing the strategic plan should have been rapidly transferred from the military 
hands of the DOD to the civilian hands of DOS, whose representatives have the 
proficiencies and assets to assume the leadership and administration of the country until it 
could be turned over to the Iraqi people. The military would remain involved after the 
war, but merely in a supporting role.  
In reality, the facts reveal that either the transition from military to civilian 
involvement was not really planned as should have been, or the implementation did not 
work smoothly and in accordance with the political and military strategic objectives. 
There was a short window of opportunity within which Iraq should have been managed 
with much more competence in order to achieve the desired ends: to help the country 
revive from the disintegration of the state, to sterilize Iraqi’ internal and external 
environments, and to prepare the nation for a careful transition to democracy. This strong, 
competent management and administration did not take place. Consequently, a series of 
postwar mistakes – incorrect assumptions, misperceptions, indecision, inappropriate 
reactions and overreactions – coupled with internal and external problems, transformed 
the Iraqi situation into one some now characterize as chaotic.7  
 
                                                 
6 For a deep analysis and evaluation of the laborious work involved with specific operations and 
activities in nation building process, see James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From 
Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, September 1, 2003) and also James Dobbins et al., 
The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006). 
7 See the research and analysis as of the end of 2006 by the Iraq Study Group, which was co-chaired 
by James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton and included a number of former highly-placed public 
officials. James A. Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage, 2006). 
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By not stepping in quickly and wisely to manage Iraq after the war, DOS and 
DOD representatives on the ground faced a Huntingtonian clash of civilizations. The 
situation was perceived as an acute power vacuum, which led many Iraqi people to seek 
profit from the chaos by looting and destroying the remaining Iraqi economy and very 
fragile infrastructure. Other causes of discontent include the Iraqi people's unmet 
expectations, the ruling power's failure to meet the population's basic needs, some cases 
of coalition forces reacting inappropriately to the growing resistance movement, a 
dangerous development towards Iraqi economic collapse, radical and controversial 
policies like deBa’athification and disbanding the Iraqi army. Iraqi perception of the 
coalition forces gradually degraded, and the positive attitude toward their liberators and 
initial joy of freedom was replaced by growing discontent and disappointment. As Keith 
Mines notes,  
DeBa’athification and the disbanding of the Iraqi army sent a clear signal 
to the Sunnis that they did not have a place in the new Iraq. The reality for 
Iraqis was that the fall of the regime produced winners (Kurds and Shiites) 
and losers (Sunnis), which fueled Sunni opposition to the Coalition. The 
key issue in Iraq remains how to empower the previously disenfranchised 
Shiites and Kurds, in a way does not disempower the Sunni. Until this is 
settled no amount of security forces or economic programs will bring 
success.8   
The situation fed a new reactionary movement and the Iraqi resistance shifted 
gradually towards a generalized insurgency against the new local political-military 
leadership and their coalition sponsors.  
D.  THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ  
Even though there are some signs of social, political and economic reforms, the 
situation, especially in the region known as the Sunni Triangle, reveals that Iraq is still far 
from achieving the actual political and military strategic objective of the war: a unified 
Iraq, capable of governing and defending itself, perhaps even economically self- 
                                                 
8 Keith W. Mines, “Economic Tools in Counterinsurgency and Post Conflict Stabilization: Lessons 
Learned in Al Anbar, Iraq, 2003-2004,” Council for Emerging Security Affairs, September 2006, 4. 
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sustaining.9 The situation is characterized by a high level of violence, as shown in Figure 1. 
The violence provokes instability, which impedes national development. The vicious 
circle is difficult to penetrate, especially with the conventional means used in waging 
regular wars.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Total Attacks by Province. 
 
Source: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Defense Report to Congress, March 2007), 15. 
 
As noted in the recent report to the U.S. Congress, “Measuring Stability and 
Security in Iraq,  
The strategic goal of the United States for Iraq remains a unified, 
democratic, federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain 
itself, and that is an ally in the war on terror. 
                                                 
9 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense Report to 
Congress in accordance with Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007–Section 9010, Public Law 
109- 289, March 2007), 1. 
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One year ago, as described in the February 2006 edition of this series of 
reports, the Iraqi people were on their way to achieving these goals. 
Unfortunately, these positive events were followed by a series of attacks 
that initiated a cycle of sectarian violence, undermined political gains, and 
challenged the Government of Iraq (GOI).10 
It would not be fair to discount the progress achieved in the last four years. There 
are positive efforts at political reforms: building the framework for democratic 
institutions, national reconciliation projects, and solving transnational issues like Iranian 
and Syrian influences on the internal insurgency, cooling tensions at the Turkish border, 
and reducing massive refugee problems focused on Syria and Jordan. Although there is 
room for improvement in fighting criminal activities, public corruption, police security, 
and the treatment of prisoners and detainees, there is sensible progress in achieving and 
implementing the rule of law.11 
In regards to economic conditions, the coalition has assisted various projects. The 
most pressing issue is the legal status of national oil revenue, which is crucial for building 
political consensus. Other relevant issues include the discrepancies between different 
regions' infrastructure development and employment rates, industries that cannot sustain 
themselves (so-called economic “black holes”) and the uneven distribution of 
investments that is dependent on the level of security. Although the oil and energy 
industries do not yet function at the same levels as before the war, there are consistent 
efforts to improve the situation. Concerns like water purification, sanitation, nutrition, 
poverty, and agriculture are all on the table for the Iraqi government and its coalition 
forces advisors.12  
Security and stability remain the primary focus for both the Iraqi political and 
military leaders and the coalition forces. The internal situation can be characterized as a 
multi-insurgent struggle between insurgents and government and coalition forces, and 
                                                 
10 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” 1. 
11 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” 3-13. 
12 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” 3-13. 
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also as a struggle between different insurgent factions for power and influence over Iraqi 
society and politics. Quoting again from “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” 
The conflict in Iraq has changed from a predominantly Sunni-led 
insurgency against foreign occupation to a struggle for the division of 
political and economic influence among sectarian groups and organized 
criminal activity. As described in the January 2007 National Intelligence 
Estimate, the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity 
of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shi’a-on-Shi’a violence, 
al-Qaida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread 
criminally motivated violence.13 
 
 
Table 1.   Goals of Key Insurgent Groups in Iraq. 
 
Source: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, (Washington D.C.: Department of 
Defense Report to Congress, March 2007), 16. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the report specifies mainly three sets of insurgents: Sunni 
insurgents; Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), an “other Sunni insurgent faction;” and Jaysh al 
Mahdi (JAM), a Shia insurgent faction. The fight for Iraqi hearts and minds and the 
efforts of the Iraqi government and its coalition advisors to meet public expectations and 
to control, administer and lead are jeopardized by those insurgent groups. The leadership 
tries hard to cool the violence with daily military actions directed at the insurgents’ core. 
                                                 
13 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” 14. 
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Nevertheless, there are many issues that must be addressed first, and the possibility of 
changing strategy deserves a thorough analysis. In his first news conference after taking 
command, General Petraeus said,  
Military action is necessary to help improve security...but it is not 
sufficient. A political resolution of various differences... of various senses 
that people do not have a stake in the successes of Iraq and so forth — that 
is crucial. That is what will determine, in the long run, the success of this 
effort.14 
E.  THE NEED TO SHIFT STRATEGY  
1.  Lykke's Model of War Strategy: Goals, Concepts, Resources 
When analyzing the war strategy in Iraq, important concepts are proposed by 




Figure 2.   A Model for Military Strategy. 
 
Source: Arthur F. Lykke, “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” in Guide to 
Strategy (U.S. Army War College, February 2001) 182.  
 
                                                 
14 David Petraeus, speaking at a news conference, “No military solution to Iraq, U.S. general says” 
CNN, 9 March 2007, available from 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/03/08/iraq.petraeus/index.html, accessed 10 March 2007. 
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The model implies that any strategy needs a correct and healthy foundation based 
on three “legs”: objectives (ends), concepts (ways to achieve the goals, or courses of 
action), and resources (means). Then, Arthur F. Lykke defines suggestively those legs in 
the following Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2.   Components of Strategy: Definitions. 
 
Source: Arthur F. Lykke, “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” in Guide to 
Strategy (U.S. Army War College, February 2001) 179. 
 
When one or more of the legs is not in touch with the reality on the ground, then 
the strategy becomes less efficient. With this in mind, the current conventional war 
strategy in Iraq has unbalanced objectives, concepts and resources. Objectively, when 
facing an unpredictable situation on the ground, a strategic shift should involve specific 
recalibrations of the initial strategy through flexible changes designed to facilitate an 
appropriate reaction. In this light it is important to see how the National War Strategy in 
Iraq has been adjusted so far. 
2.  Relevant Shortcomings of the National War Strategy, 2007 
Given the conclusions and recommendations of the Iraqi Study Group, and 
relevant considerations raised by think tank analysts like Frederick Kagan it seems clear 
that current strategy does not involve serious modification of the conventional military 
approach. It is aimed at an accelerated handover to the (presumably operational) Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF).  
 12
It should be possible to increase the available combat power in Iraq by 
about 7 brigades in the following manner. U.S. forces are in the middle of 
another rotation. In the past, CENTCOM has delayed the departure of 
units to achieve temporary increases in deployed combat forces as new 
forces arrive. This technique could be used again to generate an additional 
6 brigades or so (about 21,000 soldiers--similar to the increase maintained 
through the election cycle). Committing the rest of the reserve brigade 
now stationed in Kuwait (and leaving the battalion already called forward 
into Iraq in country) generates an additional brigade. These 7 brigades 
(about 24,500 combat troops and a similar number of support troops) 
would join the 15 brigades already in Iraq, many of which are deployed in 
or near areas designated for active operations in the plan outlined below. 
What, then, could the coalition do with such a force--a total of 77,000 
American combat troops--to defeat the insurgency?15 
One shortcoming of the strategy is the lack of authoritative control over the 
general population, the ethnic armed groups; in other words, the failure to clear and hold 
the area. The Pentagon declared that after 2004, most operations were “sweep up” 
operations directed to capture or kill insurgent or terrorist leaders. However, when the 
troops left the area of operation, various armed groups moved in quickly. Thus, the 
results of military operations were mostly temporary. The second challenge when the 
sweep up concept is applied is that the enemy has indefinite shape. The trend of the 2007 
strategy is to transition the U.S. military role from a combat posture to a supporting role 
for the ISF. Thus, the primary mission of the Army will shift to 
Support Iraqis provide greater levels of security in Baghdad in order to 
enable political and economic progress; Support Iraqis create the security 
environment in which political deals needed to sustain security gains can 
be made; Bolster Iraqi capabilities and transfer responsibility to able units 
as part of this effort.16  
With this strategy, the U.S. administration announced to the Iraqi government that 
the Iraqis are responsible for success or failure, that the sectarian issue should be 
addressed by Iraqi’s themselves, and that impartiality, with the goal of political 
consensus, should govern all government actions.  
                                                 
15 Frederick Kagan, “A Plan for Victory in Iraq,” (The weekly Standard, 22 May 2006), 16. 
16 National Strategy for War in Iraq, National Security Council, 2007. 
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One current strategic objective, the handover of responsibility to the ISF, seems 
ambitious when compared with means (resources) and ways (concepts). Even though the 
concept of restructuring and rebuilding the ISF simultaneously with the handover of the 
operational command seems reasonable, if the ISF is not adequately prepared for the task, 
the results could be negative. The shortcoming of the new strategy is that it tries to 
accomplish two conflicting goals at once. 
This may be too big a task for the ISF, which has many problems with leadership, 
logistics, funding, loyalty, and ethnic cleansing. The ISF simply cannot conduct efficient 
combat operations when restructuring.  
The Iraqi Army is also confronted by several other significant challenges:  
Units lack leadership. They lack the ability to work together and perform 
at higher levels of organization—the brigade and division level. 
Leadership training and the experience of leadership are the essential 
elements to improve performance. 
Units lack equipment. They cannot carry out their missions without 
adequate equipment. The entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for 
FY 2006 ($3 billion) is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq 
every two weeks. 
Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a month so that they 
can visit their families and take them their pay. Unit readiness rates are 
low, often at 50 percent or less. 
Units lack logistics and support. They lack the ability to sustain their 
operations, the capability to transport supplies and troops, and the capacity 
to provide their own indirect fire support, close-air support, technical 
intelligence, and medical evacuation. They will depend on the United 
States for logistics and support through at least 2007.17  
 
                                                 
17 See the research and analysis as of the end of 2006 by the Iraq Study Group, which was co-chaired 
by James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton and included a number of former highly-placed public 
officials. James A. Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage, 2006). 
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The new military approach involves a “surge” of U.S. troops which is perceived 
as too great a stretch for the Army. According to the press, some commanders on the 
ground argue that the 21,000 member surge, rather than immediately improving security 
and stability, will offer more potential targets to insurgents. 
The military's caution on shipping thousands of additional troops 
temporarily to Iraq is based on a fear that the move could be ineffective 
without bold new political and economic steps. Commanders also worry 
that the already stretched Army and Marine Corps would be even thinner 
once the short-term surge ended. Bush's newly expressed interest in 
making the military larger would have little impact on that worry because 
it will take much longer to add substantially to the size of the military.18 
Overall, the 2007 war strategy involves a disproportion in the balance between 
ways (concepts) and means (resources – mainly conventional) of strategical 
implementation in order to achieve the required ends (objectives) of stabilizing and 
securing the complex and unconventional Iraqi war environment, and further on, 
democratize and reconstruct the country. 
3.  Arreguin-Toft Asymmetric Theory of Conflict 
Based on carefully evaluated historical evidence, Ivan Arreguin-Toft developed a 
solid theory demonstrating that the symmetry or asymmetry of belligerent forces' 
strategies is an essential determinant of the final outcome of the war. In his theory, 
especially relevant to low intensity conflict, there is special attention to the question, 
“How do the weak win wars?”  
Understanding the conditions under which weak actors win wars is 
important for two reasons. First, if there are dynamics unique to 
asymmetric conflicts, or if their analysis provides fresh insights into 
symmetrical conflicts, a general explanation of asymmetric conflict 
outcomes is not only desirable but necessary, both to reduce the likelihood 
of unwinnable wars and to increase the chances of U.S. success when a 
resort to arms is necessary. Second, because asymmetric conflicts ranging 
from catastrophic terrorism to military intervention in interstate, ethnic, 
and civil wars are the most likely threat to U.S. security and interests, only 
                                                 
18 Robert Burns, “Iraq troop buildup idea worries generals,” (The Washington Post, 19 December 
2006), 1. 
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a general theory of symmetric conflict outcomes can guide U.S. 
policymakers in their efforts to build the kinds of armed and other forces 
necessary to implement an effective U.S. strategic response.19  
The weak, including insurgency movements, win low intensity conflicts by using 
an asymmetric strategic approach. If the insurgents fight unconventionally against the 
state entrenched in conventional vision, the chances to win will seldom favor the weak 
actor.20 If the insurgents use an unconventional (indirect) strategy against a conventional 
(direct) state strategy, then the insurgents are more likely to win.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Percentage of Asymmetric Conflict Victories by Type of Actor in Forty 
Year Periods. 
 
Source: Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric 
Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 97.   
 
The implication is that coalition force efforts in Iraq are less efficient when a 
conventional response is applied to an unconventional threat, and the evidence seems to 
bear this out. To recalibrate the situation, one should change the strategy to correspond to 
that used by enemy, which in this case is an unconventional approach.  
                                                 
19 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press), 94. 
20 Arreguin-Toft, 94 -128.  
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4.  Conclusions of the Iraq Study Group  
In November 2006, the Iraq Study Group endorsed a more complex diplomatic, 
economic and military package to deal with the Iraq war situation. Their emphasis on the 
need for a different strategic approach emerges from the group's 72 specific 
recommendations.  
Referring to the military engagement, the report says that the U.S. army should 
transition from its “clear, hold and reconstruct” mission. To play a supporting role for 
Iraqi forces, U.S. small units and advisors would be embedded in Iraqi battalions to 
provide expertise against sectarian violence and the terrorist attacks. Interestingly, the 
study explores four possible solutions regarding the complex situation in Iraq: a 
diplomatic solution, staying the course, increasing the level of force, or an exit solution. 
Retreat is not an option.  
Because of the importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, and the 
role and commitments of the United States in initiating events that have 
led to the current situation, we believe it would be wrong for the United 
States to abandon the country through a precipitate withdrawal of troops 
and support. A premature American departure from Iraq would almost 
certainly produce greater sectarian violence and further deterioration of 
conditions, leading to a number of the adverse consequences outlined 
above. The near-term results would be a significant power vacuum, greater 
human suffering, and regional destabilization.21 
The surge of U.S. forces is not recommended by the group: 
Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental 
cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of national reconciliation. 
A senior American general told us that adding U.S. troops might 
temporarily help limit violence in a highly localized area. However, past 
experience indicates that the violence would simply rekindle as soon as 
U.S. forces are moved to another area. As another American general told 
us, if the Iraqi government does not make political progress, “no troops in 
the world will provide security.”22 
                                                 
21 Baker et al., 37.  
22 Baker et al., 33. 
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Finally, the study criticizes the current strategy as ineffective. In social and 
political terms, the federalization solution and the constitution of three semiautonomous 
regions is perceived as a weak solution due to the intermingled distribution of minorities 
in all 18 provinces of Iraq and because the process will further destabilize Iraq, especially 
in regard to revenue. 
The report calls for a change in the military approach in order to reduce the U.S. 
presence in Iraq.  
In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to be 
taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region. Our most important 
recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political 
efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. 
forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its 
combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two 
recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another. If they 
are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves forward 
with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better 
future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an 
important part of the world, and America’s credibility, interests, and 
values will be protected.23 
In concluding, the Iraq Study Group acknowledges the necessity for a new 
military strategy in Iraq, recommending that military strategy be embedded in a more 
complex package of aggressive diplomacy and economic reform.  
F.  SUMMARY 
This chapter establishes that the complexity of the Iraq situation requires a 
complex solution. The U.S. administration and its military leadership developed a 
strategically innovative approach for the initial conventional war but failed to anticipate 
or recognize the unconventional results and to adjust accordingly.  
Many aspects of the situation in Iraq were misperceived or unnoticed from the 
beginning; these proved to be determining factors for subsequent developments in the 
Iraq conflict, serving as premises, and therefore causes, of the chaotic situation that 
                                                 
23 Baker et al., 34. 
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emerged on the ground after the fall of Baghdad. This terrible conjunction of forces 
instigated the transition from the initial success of the military invasion to a potential 
failure with horrible consequences for the security and stability of Iraq, the Middle East, 
and possibly the entire world. As the Iraq Study Group writes,   
If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe. 
A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq’s government and a 
humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-
Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and 
expand its base of operations. The global standing of the United States 
could be diminished.24 
The need to explore a different strategic approach using existing models is 
obvious. Accordingly, the next chapter explores the theoretical and practical aspects of 
Professor Gordon McCormick's Mystic Diamond strategic model as a possible source of 
solutions to the Iraqi conflict.  
                                                 
24 Baker et al., xiv. 
 19
II.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE MYSTIC DIAMOND 
MODEL 
A.  THE IMPORTANCE OF MODELS   
Models are organizing devices to help political and military leaders identify 
critical issues. Intellectual models simplify reality. To be validated, a model must be 
tested in realistic conditions and must have predictive as well as explanatory power. 
Assuming that the model is accurate, other measures of its value are simplicity, 
practicality, and power. Simplicity is critical for presenting the model to others. To be 
practical, the model should be fully understood at the individual, organizational and 
strategic level, while a powerful model is useful for prediction.  
B. MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MYSTIC DIAMOND MODEL 
McCormick's Mystic Diamond model illustrates the conditions, dynamics, and 
complexity of an insurgency and prescribes the appropriate steps for successful 
counterinsurgency strategy.25 The model involves two levels of analysis. At the strategic 
level, it emphasizes the necessity of winning popular support in order to achieve the 
desired political objective. “Like the moving bubble on a level, the behavior of the bulk 
of the populace will shift to assist either the government or the insurgents, depending on 
the carrots and sticks (rewards and punishments) used by each side.”26  At the operational 
and tactical level, the model proposes a complex package of interdependent social, 
political, judicial, economical, and military solutions to isolate and neutralize the core of 
insurgency.  
This chapter describes the key variables in the Mystic Diamond model and their 
theoretical relationships. To grasp the dynamic of the model, it is necessary to understand 
                                                 
25 Gordon McCormick currently serves as Chair of the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. 
26 Erik P. Wendt, citing a lecture by McCormick, in Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Model,” 
Special Warfare Bulletin, September 2005, 2.  
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the universal features of insurgency movements, including their evolution, motivation, 
passive support, inputs/outputs, actionable intelligence and conversion mechanisms. 
After describing key factors in the evolution of insurgency, this chapter presents the 
spectrum of strategies and objectives available to both the state and the counter-state. The 
final section of this chapter addresses the main characteristics of appropriate state 
responses in an insurgency environment.27 The purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
main features of the Mystic Diamond model, which in later chapters is used to analyze 
the objectives, tactics, and patterns of the Iraqi insurgency and to develop of a coherent 
strategy to disrupt and isolate the insurgency.  
The main idea of the Mystic Diamond is that in an insurgent environment, unlike 
in conventional war, opponents compete to control and influence the population to 
support their own objectives. If the behavior of the population is crucial in implementing 
strategy, the model identifies contributing factors which influence the population's 
behavior. These factors, which involve the importance of political environment, political 
motivation and support for insurgency or state, are described in the next section. Without 
identifying the source of an insurgency's power and how it transforms internal and 
external inputs into action, the state cannot articulate an efficient strategy in response.  
For both state and counter-state actors, the structure is the main determinant only 
at the beginning of the process; strategy subsequently becomes more important for 
winning popular support. This applies again for both actors; state and counter-state.  
                                                 
27 Due to space limitations, this thesis does not review the root causes of insurgency or the nature of 
modern war. It should be noted that the Mystic Diamond Model is still being evaluated by the author, so 




































Figure 4.   Mystic Diamond Model. 
 
Source: Professor Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” class, 2006. 
 
The Mystic Diamond Model discussed in greater detail below is presented in 
Figure 4. The model reveals the importance of a correct sequence of steps when 
implementing counter-insurgency strategy. If the state discounts the importance of 
popular support and legitimacy for international actors, and applies the most direct 
approach by attacking the core of the insurgency, the results are often disastrous. The 
correct sequence of steps to be taken by the state are described graphically in Figure 1 
and in more detail in the strategic options section of this chapter.  
When analyzing the schematic structure of the model, it is easy to note its 
simplicity and value. In an insurgency environment, this model states that there are two 
opponents or competitors struggling for mutual elimination. Each can have two main 
sources of inputs: internal inputs, from the population, and external inputs, from 
international actors. Oftentimes the battle to control the population is the deciding factor 
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in the outcome of insurgency. Nevertheless, external support can be also very important. 
The bottom line is that the state initially has to cut the links between the population and 
insurgents while at the same time cutting the links between insurgents and international 
supporters. The next step is for the state is to attack and disrupt the internal and external 
infrastructure of insurgent’s organization. Only after isolating the core of insurgency, 
stopping its growth and fully controlling the population and political space can the state 
efficiently “take out” the insurgents. 
According to Wendt, “this model will allow planners to optimize 
counterinsurgency resources by addressing all aspects of insurgent conflict 
simultaneously and holistically rather in a disjointed finger-in-the-dike fashion.”28 The 
model organizes a large number of factors into a coherent diagram which depicts their 
relationships. Those factors—features of insurgency, strategic options, and conventional 
versus unconventional approaches—are described in the following sections. 
C.  MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY  
Any insurgency has three major characteristics: structure, infrastructure and 
strategy. The structure is how the insurgency is organized, controlled and commanded by 
its leadership. Usually, the incipient structure it is similar to a network or even a 
“network of networks.” In the beginning, decentralization to ensure the survivability of 
the movement is very high, with a flat type of organization, loose command and control, 
and highly compartmentalized cells. This incipient form is most vulnerable, so an 
insurgency must grow and regenerate rapidly in order to overcome the power of the state.  
Insurgents, tend to develop decentralized authority structures as they 
mature, even where they originally form around a single charismatic 
individual or centralized charter group. Where the state is constructed 
from the top down, insurgencies are built from the bottom up. They not 
only emerge locally, they remain tied to an increasingly distributed local 
base as they grow.29 
                                                 
28 Erik P. Wendt, citing a lecture by McCormick, in Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Model,” 
Special Warfare Bulletin, September 2005, 5.  
29 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, Lauren A. Harrison, Things Fall Apart: The Endgame 
Dynamics of Internal Wars, Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, 2007, 331. 
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The infrastructure represents all the connections between the population and 
external supporters and the insurgency, links which allow the conversion of inputs into 
outputs. For the moment it is sufficient to note that regarding strategy, the insurgents 
have a clear objective: to disrupt the state's power to maintain stability and order. The 
objective of the state is to retain power and defeat or displace its competitors. The 
insurgency’s objective is to expand its popular support and defeat or displace the state.30 
In the beginning, insurgents use violence and terror against the state and its 
supporters to undermine state authority. The evolution of the insurgency can be hard to 
predict, but it is clear that an insurgency has to attain a critical mass to move to the next 
phase. At that point, an insurgency can grow exponentially by winning a large spectrum 
of popular support, or it might maintain the status quo of instability and terror by 
engaging the state in a prolonged attrition war. 
First, if the insurgency is able to maintain a positive rate of growth, over 
time it will eventually reach the point where it can either defeat or displace 
its opponent. Second, if the rate growth after attrition stabilizes short of 
what is needed to win, but is still sufficient to allow it to stay in the game, 
the conflict can continue indefinitely.31 
The extinction of the insurgency occurs only if the state has adequate solutions to 
the problem. The evolution process is graphically displayed in the Figure 5.  
                                                 
30 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, Lauren A. Harrison, 322. 
31 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerilla 














The Mystic Diamond  Model states that the insurgency starts from a weak position. By attaining critical 
mass, the insurgency  could grow and overcome the state, it could lose  popular support and disappear, or it 
could maintain the influence over the population  and engage the state in a prolonged war. Insurgency starts 
from a weak position but by wining   popular  support,  can  easily overcome the state power.
State starts with







The evolution of insurgency
 
Figure 5.   The Evolution of Insurgency. 
 
Source: Professor Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” class, 2006. 
1.  The Life Cycle of Insurgencies  
The famous insurgent leader Mao Tse Tung characterizes the life cycle of 
insurgency as having three main stages: defensive, equilibrium, and offensive. From the 
perspective of the insurgents, Stage 1 is the defensive stage. The insurgency is smaller 
than the state, with limited resources and limited manpower. The only advantage the 
insurgents have in this phase is the informational advantage. This advantage is conferred 
by the underground profile of incipient insurgency and by the fact that insurgents can 
better monitor the state actions which are more visible. Stage 2, the stage of equilibrium, 
occurs when the powers of the state and insurgency are roughly equal. There may be a 
period of dual power, with the country divided into different regions of influence and 
authority. In this situation, the insurgents can play the attrition card, which in the long 
term might achieve the desired effect: Stage 3, the offensive stage. With adequate growth, 
the insurgency becomes a larger force than the state and can finally react with a 
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conventional offense. The guerillas' growth rate must become faster than the force 
advantage of the state in order for the insurgents to get through the insulation phase32. 
There is a correlation between the size of the opposition and the state's ability to detect it. 
This means there is a time when the guerillas should grow and a time for them to sit tight 
so as to remain unseen. Accordingly, until the critical mass is reached, the insurgency 
could know a nonlinear evolution characterized by ups and downs. Once the critical mass 
has been reached, also the conditions for generalizing the conflict are created. The 
environment context can be crucial for the development of an insurgency. 
2.  The Environmental Spectrum 
The struggle between the state and counter-state involves controlling the political 
space which can be conceptualized as an environmental spectrum with two extremes. In 
the middle is the population, which itself has different layers of affiliation with one or 
even both of the extremes; the population may include active and passive supporters, 
moderates, and sympathizers. Popular support is somewhere in the middle of the political 
space. The mobilisable population can be divided into three groups: core supporters of 
the state, core supporters of the insurgency, and a large middle group of individuals who 
are prepared to support one side the other depending on the circumstances of the 
struggle.33 The structural environment acts as the context for the revolution or 
insurgency. The area of influence is graphically described in Figure 6. The strategic space 
is in the middle, and the migration of a segment of population towards one extreme or 
another can determine the outcome of the conflict. McCormick says,  
The strategic space in between, gives opportunities for every side to 
influence the behavior of the population. That is why it becomes a matter 
of how you implement the strategy to influence and determine the desired 
outcome.34   
                                                 
32 Insulation phase represents the portion of insurgency lifecycle where, the influence exercised by the 
insurgents can not change the behavior of major population. 
33 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, 301. 
























Area of Influence Model
 
 
Figure 6.   Area of Influence Model  
 
Source: Professor Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” class, 2006. 
 
Another important idea is that at the extreme edges, structure determines who 
wins or loses, but in the middle, strategy is the dominant factor. Depending on a 
particular situation and context, if the environment is so stable and the state structural 
circumstances are effective, then there is no possibility for insurgency success, because 
most of the population will support the state actions; (as the blue line shows in the next 
figure). Conversely, at the other end of the spectrum, the environment is so unstable, and 
the bulk of the population is sympathetic with the movement that no matter how 
incompetent the insurgents may be, and no matter how competent the government is, 




If the opposition is operating in a typical mobilization environment, there 
is come critical size beyond which its level of popular support will begin 
to grow of its own accord. Once this crossover point is reached, the group 
will enjoy the bandwagon effects associated with achieving a position of 
critical mass. The chief operational problem it faces is getting to this point 
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Figure 7.   Area of Influence Model. 
 
Source: Professor Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” class, 2006. 
 
To summarize the environmental spectrum analysis, the Mystic Diamond model 
reveals that the success in unconventional conflict has two essential conditions. The 
necessary condition is the structure, and the sufficient condition is strategy. Whichever 
side is better managing the strategy and influence the population support, will eventually 
                                                 
35 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, 317. 
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win the conflict. Certainly there are some limits, in between which, the strategy plays a 
role, above those limits, there is little one actor can do to influence the outcome. In time, 
depending on the package (pure preferences, incentives, expectations), the undecided 
segment of the population could shift from one side to another, determining the outcome 
of the conflict. 
By influencing popular expectation , and through this, the expected value 
of supporting one player against the other, popular beliefs about shifting 
balance of power has a significant and highly variable influence over the 
context in which both sides approach mobilization.36 
3.  Motivation 
According to McCormick, motivation is defined by pure preference, selective 
incentives and expectations that shape a person’s motivation. Motivation can determine 
the shift of popular affiliation towards one end of the political space. In the Iraq case, one 
end of the political space is occupied by counter-state hard core insurgents, “true 
believers,” and the other end is held by the state.  
In every case and every way the choices people make are subjective, based 
on a highly personalized (and variable) utility function, socially 
conditioned values, imperfect information, and sometimes surprisingly 
inability to sort through and evaluate the information they have available 
to them at the time.37 
Insurgents use both punishments and rewards to influence the population's 
conditioned preferences and gain its support. The state strategy focuses on restricting 
potential for active support of the insurgents, but the state can do little to influence or 
stop passive support. Furthermore, punishment works more in favor of insurgents, who 
have no restrictions in applying violence. 
 
 
                                                 
36 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, 296. 
37 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, 297. 
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4.  Passive Support 
Historical records of insurgencies in China, Cuba, Malaya and the Philippines 
show that successful insurgencies initially have public support that is two percent active 
and 98 percent passive. This means that in the beginning, only a small fraction of the 
population chooses violence to express their political grievances.38 While passive support 
does not buttress insurgent activities other than with sympathy and tolerance, it gives 
insurgents an informational advantage over the state, and freedom of maneuver.  
McCormick says, “People act according to their pure preferences, selective 
incentives and expectations, which are subject to manipulation by both the state and the 
counter-state.”39 For the state at the operational level, it is most important to gain 
political control of the population in order to counter insurgents' efforts at coercion. 
Evidence suggests growing active Iraqi support for insurgents due to coalition and 
government failure to maintain security and provide basic needs, economic decline, 
sectarian cleansing and collateral casualties.  
The low resolution and indirect tactics used by insurgents has a direct effect on 
state forces posture by creating a gradual shifting from a passive diplomatic approach to a 
more aggressive and retaliatory responses. In this case the popular opinion about 
coalition forces shifts conversely they are perceived less as “liberators” and more as 
“occupation forces.”  
Because it is much easier to identify the movement sympathizers than its 
participants, the unfortunate tendency is to apply repression 
indiscriminately…This not only creates moral outrage, it destroys the 




                                                 
38 Nathan Leites, Charles Wolf, Jr., “Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgents 
Conflicts,” (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, February, 1970). 
39 Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” 2006.  
40 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, 308. 
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5.  Inputs, Outputs, and the Conversion Mechanism 
External support facilitates the growth of insurgency by providing tactical, 
procedures, logistical support and communications. The core of the problem is mainly not 
the multiplier role assured by external support, but the indigenous support, which fuels 
the regeneration process.  
External and internal support, flow to a cadre or infrastructure, where they 
will be refined and translated into output. It is important to note that 
support will likely come from a mixture of external and internal sources. 
Defining where the majority of insurgent support is coming from allows 
for the proportionate and correct application of COIN [counterinsurgency] 
resources.41  
A mechanism model is very important for an insurgency movement, because it 
translates of inputs to outputs. Derived from the writings of Nanthan Leites and Charles 
Wolf Jr, this model is vital for understanding the differences between conventional and 
unconventional approaches to COIN, as well as for defining where COIN operations 
should focus the priority of their effort.42 According with the model, inputs are resources 
(basically people, guns and money) and outputs are operations (to organize, train, equip, 
coordinate and operate). Outputs are the final product of any activity that allocates 
resources. They “can range from armed forces patrolling to the placement of improvised 
explosive devices (IED), to suicide bombings.”43 Initially, faced with scarcity of 
resources and support, insurgents are forced to make choices and therefore to go for the 
maximum effect with minimum resources as the best return on investment. For 
insurgents, more important than physical destruction is the moral impact of the message 
they send to state supporters. It is crucial to send a clear and strong message that they 
fight for a just cause and will sacrifice to achieve victory. The population is a source of 
endogenous inputs. In the absence of an endogenous connection, the insurgency becomes 
                                                 
41 Erik P. Wendt, citing a lecture by McCormick, in Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Model,” 
(Fort Bragg: Special Warfare Bulletin, September 2005), 5.  
42 Erik P. Wendt, citing Leitis and Wolf Jr., in Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Model,” (Fort 
Bragg: Special Warfare Bulletin, September 2005), 5.  
43 Wendt, 6. 
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easily visible. By not being embedded within the population, the insurgency is an easy 
target for conventional decisive actions. In the absence of internal support, the external 
ones become exposed and easily defeated. The equation is graphically represented in 
Figure 7, which shows that exogenous and endogenous inputs are transformed through 
the conversion mechanism into outputs, which in the end, leads to authoritative control 
over political space and population. If one element of the equation is removed, the 






















The conversion mechanism 
of inputs into outputs
 
Figure 8.   Conversion Mechanism. 
 
Source: Leites, Nathan; Wolf, Jr., Charles,” Rebellion and authority: an analytic essay on 
insurgents conflicts,” and Professor Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” 
class, 2006. 
 
As a general rule, insurgents seek to grow. At the same time, the state and its 
internal and external supporters try to contain the situation and isolate the hard core of the 
insurgent organization. Only after isolation they can be physically eliminated. The 
insurgent strategy is revealed by outputs—by actions—not by words. In the case of a 
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healthy growing insurgency, the growth cycle is iterative, little by little. Each stage of a 
cycle is supposed to lay the groundwork for the next one. Step by step, the insurgent 
footprint increases, more resources are gained; more control is achieved and so on. The 
flow of inputs within the political space is represented in Figure 4.  
In this light, one can understand why it is important for the state to have a feasible 
strategy in place. The following section details the available strategic options for the state 
and counter-state actors. 
C. STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
In a closed political environment, the state and the counter-state have limited 
strategic options. The insurgency has to grow constantly in order to win. The state has the 
difficult task of separating insurgents from the population while simultaneously cutting 
off external support. If the state disregards the later, then tactical successes cannot stop 
the regeneration of the insurgency. The strategic objectives of the state and insurgent are 
the same: influencing the behavior of populace and establishing political control. 
1.  Strategic Approach of the State against the Insurgents  
According to McCormick, for the state, the struggle between the state and an 
insurgency involves five basic strategic “legs,” or elements: (1) Building a bond with the 
population (infrastructure development); (2) Infrastructure targeting and disrupting 
relations between the insurgents and the population; (3) Direct action targeted killing of 
high value targets (HVT) as the first order effect (indiscriminate methods can produce 
alienation); (1’) Building state legitimacy with relevant international actors including the 
intelligence community (developing intelligence infrastructure and actionable 
intelligence); (2’) Disrupting relations between insurgents and international sponsors 
(infrastructure targeting). The correct sequence of strategic steps is graphically 
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Figure 9.   The Strategic Steps to be Implemented by the State in Counterinsurgency. 
 
Source: Professor Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” class, 2006. 
 
The main counterinsurgency objectives are as follows: Objective 1 is 
“establishing control and legitimacy over the population (leg 1), objective 2 is building 
legitimacy with international actors (leg 1’).”44 The state cannot strike at the 
infrastructure between the insurgency and population until this connection becomes 
visible; the same can be said for state efforts to disrupt the infrastructure between 
insurgents and their external support. The insurgents cannot be seen until the state 
establishes effective control over the population and consequently influences the  
 
 
                                                 
44 Wendt, citing McCormick, 6.  
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population's behavior. The state also must win the legitimacy struggle in the population 
and the international arena. As it establishes control, it can gradually shift towards the 
second objective. 
Objective 2 is disrupting the insurgency infrastructure (leg 2) and its external 
support (leg 2’). The insurgents become visible thanks to the information, legitimacy and 
support from the population and international arena; this allows the state to attack the 
infrastructure of the insurgency and to discover their soft spots. 
Objective 3 is striking directly at the insurgency core (leg 3). Without popular 
support, intelligence or clarity about the insurgents, the state cannot strike directly and 
effectively. After the insurgency is visible and the links with its supporters disrupted, the 
hard core can be neutralized or destroyed. This objective can be accomplished by 
numerous integrated operations, including raids on insurgency bases or cache points, 
leadership targeting to kill or capture HVT, and other visible direct actions. At this point 
the state must still maintain the operational status quo achieved by the first two 
objectives. The outcome of each strategic objective determines the success of subsequent 
efforts. The movement from one objective to the next is sequential, and, at the tactical 
level, the state can extend its actions by carefully transitioning from one objective to the 
next.  
2.  Sequence for Implementing State Objectives 
The best way to deal with insurgency is indirectly, through the population. To 
defeat the insurgents, the state has to accomplish the three objectives. When the 
insurgency becomes visible enough, the state has to address the objectives, either 
sequentially or simultaneously, in accordance with strategic requirements.  
To the conventionally minded, the conflict between the state and the counter-state 
seems mostly direct, a force against force confrontation. But here it is all about how the 
weak can win the game. If insurgents are dying or disappearing, the state is easily 
deceived into a false sense of victory while the insurgency lives on. 
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Thus, if the strategic approach is based solely or primarily on the third objective 
of striking directly against the insurgent core, the insurgency will never be neutralized or 
destroyed because the movement will generally retain the capability to regenerate. The 
Mystic Diamond model sequencing of events directs the state into the specific series of 
actions that the state needs to win. The most direct way to prosecute this kind of war is 
indirectly. For the state, the first goal is to overcome the lack of information. For the 
insurgents, the first goal is to overcome their lack of force. Insurgency is like an 
amorphous gas, constantly changing, never taking a solid shape. As McCormick says, 
“Insurgency is a force in development and the state is a force in being.” He explains that  
Each element of this struggle is grounded in a geographical and political 
space. Insurgents are most efficient through differentiation; they don’t 
have to compete for resources. Then, finding information becomes more 
difficult because insurgents are separate elements in various sectors of the 
population, like a network. However, they still compete for power and 
control over the population unless their weaknesses are understood and 
can effectively be exploited by the state.45  
3.  Strategic Approach of the Insurgents  
The insurgency movement has objectives that mirror the state's objectives.  
Objective 1 for the insurgents is developing the infrastructure through popular or 
external support. This allows the insurgency to gain resources, credibility and strength 
and leads to the next step, which is limiting state influence in the political space. In the 
early stages the insurgency the leaders pose questions like “How can the movement 
extend its infrastructure? What are the methods for maximizing the growth rate of the 
insurgency? What are ways to develop the infrastructure unmolested in order to achieve 
surprise?”46 When insurgents have more resources, they grow exponentially and can 
increase attacks against the state. More attacks increase the credibility and legitimacy of 
their organization which in turn accelerates the influx of resources. 
                                                 
45 Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” 2006. 
46 Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” 2006. 
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Objective 2 is attacking the state’s infrastructure and external support. To extend 
their own infrastructure further, the insurgency has to diminish the infrastructure of the 
state, which it does by attacking the instruments of the state. Terror is one of the most 
effective tactics initially because with limited inputs, terror allows the insurgents to 
achieve maximum outputs.  
Directed violence is used, in the first place, as an instrument of agitation 
or ‘propaganda by the deed’, designed to define the terms of the struggle 
and force people to take a political position. It is also used to provoke the 
state into excessive and misdirected use of counter-violence in the hope 
that this will alienate otherwise neutral elements of the population and 
reshape their preferences in the favor of the opposition.47 
Control is critical; without controlling the population, the insurgency cannot 
survive. Insurgent movements' growth will always be restricted by the state, which is why 
insurgency is likely to start in places with ineffective state control. One of the most 
important prescriptions for the growth phase of the insurgency is to resist the urge to go 
conventional against the military power of the state. 
Objective 3 is to attack the state. The use of terrorism in combination with 
concentric attacks against state pillars (police, military, political leadership) and external 
supporters diminishes public confidence in the state’s ability to insure a secure and 
healthy environment.  
Over time the balance of power shifts. Insurgents can exploit their size advantage 
to gain power. In the case of an occupying force, as in Iraq, the insurgents do not need to 
get bigger than the state, but only big enough to influence the occupier's withdrawal 
process. Conventional armies lose if they do not win – insurgents drive them out by not 
losing.48 Once the first obstacle is eliminated, then the next objective for insurgency is to 
reach the next phase the offensive phase, when it can conventional engage the state. 
 
                                                 
47 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, 318. 
48 Gordon McCormick citing Henry Kissinger during NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” 
2006. 
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4.  Sequence for Implementing Insurgent Objectives  
The optimal sequence for the insurgent’s strategic implementation is symmetrical 
with the state’s strategic implementation. The first strategic objective (leg 1 and leg 1’) 
lays the groundwork for the second (leg 2 and leg 2’) who determine the conditions for 
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Figure 10.   Strategic Implementation for the Counter-state. 
 
Source: Professor Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” class, 2006. 
D.  CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACHES IN 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Conventional war is not obsolete; therefore in order to wage this type of conflict, 
there is still the need for a powerful, versatile, joint, conventional force. Furthermore, 
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even in unconventional conflict, the conventional forces can play an important supporting 
role for an unconventional force. Nevertheless, today, the warfare is shifting from 
conventional conflict to low intensity, unconventional conflict. To better respond, the 
state's army should also shift its thinking, resources and application of force. If the army 
and political leaders cannot make the necessary adjustments, the army might win all the 
battles and still lose the war. This paradox emerges in unconventional environments 
where conventional army responses multiply problems and accelerate the growth of the 
insurgency. This seems to imply that the future calls for two types of armies: 
conventional and unconventional. So far, no country can afford this. So what is the 
solution? For a rational analysis, one should first recognize the problem, then design the 
strategy, and only then select and organize the necessary force package, incentives, and 
coercion measures. In other words, the force has to be tailored according to the nature of 
the conflict. The default position for most military establishment is the conventional 
mindset: “We need to kill the enemy and then the problem is solved.” The general 
perception is that once the enemy is killed, nobody will replace him to continue the 
struggle. The facts show that the regeneration process is more rapid than expected. 
Killing the enemy in counterinsurgency is a weak win. As McCormick says, “The 
conventional mindset states that it is necessary to destroy the enemy and after that to 
establish the control. The unconventional approach states that it is necessary to establish 
control and only after that to kill or capture the enemy.”49 For success, the state must 
grasp the situation in its entirety and reduce the insurgents' ability to embed in the 
population. Insurgents attack state symbols to erode the linkage between state and 
population. The state has to reduce the insurgent’s freedom of maneuver. Actionable 
intelligence is paramount. Population and intelligence are resource bases. The state and 
counter-state compete for the same population and the same international actors. As 
McCormick has noted, the state begins with a force advantage. The counter-state begins 
with an informational advantage. The state builds bonds with the population to get more 
information. The counter-state builds bonds with the population to get more people, guns, 
and money.  
                                                 
49 Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” 2006. 
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The state begins the game with a force advantage but an information 
disadvantage. The insurgents, by contrast, enter the game, with an 
information advantage and a force disadvantage. They are generally able 
to see what they wish to hit, but they have limited ability to hit what they 
see. This asymmetry can be exploited by provoking the state into striking 
out at targets it cannot see, alienating the population, who become victims-
by-substitution, and pushing people into the arms of the insurgents.50 
The conventional approach cannot handle the situation from the strongholds, 
where military forces are totally separated from locals and leave the political space in the 
hands of the insurgents. An effective intelligence network is the key in understanding the 
motives, culture, decision processes, resources, capabilities, and locations of real and 
potential adversaries. This situational awareness cannot be achieved by force; therefore 
the overwhelming power of conventional forces contributes little to the creation and 
maintenance of the information network.  
Another key in counterinsurgency is to reverse the growth curve of the 
movement. Targeting it is difficult and counterproductive if not based on reliable human 
intelligence (HUMINT) sources. The conventional approach only accelerates the growth 
of insurgency. Moreover, if collateral casualties are not considered carefully, the pure 
preference of the population tilts towards insurgency.  
In the first two stages, defense and equilibrium, the insurgency has the 
informational advantage over the state and the state has trouble identifying and locating 
targets, so it is crucial that the state win popular support to increase the flow of 
information about insurgent activities and to achieve the necessary resolution regarding 
the insurgents infrastructure. Once the intelligence is actionable, the insurgents do not 
stand a chance against state power. The conventional approach has little success because 
it targets only what is visible at the surface, disregarding the insurgents' underground 
links to the population. The unconventional approach emphasizes integrating surrogate 
forces into the populace to acquire actionable intelligence. Actionable intelligence 
represents a vital factor in counter insurgency operations.  
                                                 
50 Gordon H. McCormick, Frank Giordano, Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerilla 
Mobilization, (Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, 2007), 308. 
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As T. E. Lawrence famously described it, fighting rebels is “like eating 
soup with a knife.” Guerrillas do not depend on vulnerable lines of supply 
and communications, so counterinsurgents must target them directly, and 
even a few thousand armed guerrillas can create chaos in a country of tens 
millions. Guerrillas camouflage themselves among the population; 
frequently the only way to distinguish an insurgent from population; 
frequently the only way to distinguish an insurgent from a civilian is when 
he (or she) opens fire.51 
Cultural awareness and the respect of local people, combined with a specific 
mixture of incentives and punishments, should eliminate conflicts between state/coalition 
forces and the population. Unconventional forces, external or internal, have a better 





























Figure 11.   Winning Strategies for Conventional versus Unconventional War. 
 
Source: Professor Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” class, 2006. 
                                                 
51 Daryl G. Press and Benjamin Valentino, “A Victory, But Little Is Gained,” New York Times, November 17, 
2004, 3. 
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The figure above, displays the opposite sequence of strategic goals pursued by 
conventional and unconventional strategies. Thus, becomes evident that the fundamental 
difference between these two strategies is that what is the necessary initial condition in 
unconventional approach, the control over the population, is conversely the final 
objective in conventional approach. Another key aspect when fighting the insurgents is 
the level of force engaged by the state. When overreacting, the state fuels the insurgency, 
accelerating its regeneration and growth. This idea is expressed by the equivalent 
response model. According to Wendt,  
The equivalent response model is vital to strategic counterinsurgency 
modeling because it demonstrates that insurgent warfare is the thinking 
man’s game in the extreme. To be successful, counterinsurgency forces 
must take the initiative, carefully chose their actions, weigh possible 
actions against the band of excellence, and anticipate the adversary’s 
reaction. An effective strategy initiates actions that fall within the band of 
excellence, but cause the opponent to react with actions that fall outside 
the band. When insurgents actions fall outside the band, the bubble of the 
area of influence model will shift, and we can expect corresponding 
decreases in people, guns, and money from the population and internal 
insurgent supporters, further diminishing the insurgent’s ability to produce 
output.52  
E.  CONCLUSION: MYSTIC DIAMOND MODEL PRINCIPLES 
In conclusion, this chapter presents three main principles of the Mystic Diamond 
model. Examining these principles clarifies why it is necessary that the state establish a 
proportional symmetric reaction to combat insurgency. In other words, the model shows 
that an effective strategy will find and engage the appropriate response to the violence 
induced by insurgency. 
1.  The Principle of Mutual Exclusion  
The political space has natural borders. Over time, one entity will dominate and 
control the space. Perfect equilibrium is impossible, especially when radicalization takes 
place. One side always has an edge over the other. Each actor begins with an advantage 
                                                 
52 Wendt, citing McCormick, 5. 
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that determines their priorities for strategic objectives, and each side must learn to 
leverage its opening advantage. The state has to create the perception that the bad guys 
will be captured or killed no matter how long it takes and how many resources are spent. 
The Principle of Mutual Exclusion states that if one side accomplishes one of its 
objectives; the other side does not control the political space. The regime starts out with 
nominal power. The real power comes in filling up the political space. The solution for 
the state is to take the country village by village, creating and establishing an 
administrative presence.  
Some strategies are required by both sides to engage an apathetic population 
which would otherwise support the state. The regime may not get into the game until the 
space is contested. The solution for the state is to establish an administrative presence and 
take the country village by village as a strategy that attacks the insurgents' infrastructure. 
2.  The Principle of Feedback  
In the first phase, the state's concern is information; the insurgency needs inputs - 
people, guns and money. The state has the resource advantage, though the feedback about 
their influence over the insurgency is quite limited. The insurgents have the information 
advantage and an obvious deficit in resources. The effectiveness of insurgents is defined 
by the quality and quantity of its attacks over state. 
The group’s visible performance, in such cases, will be used as a surrogate 
variable to measure its capability and prospects. The most important 
measure of performance is the quality and quantity of its attacks. All other 
things being equal, an effective and rising pattern of violence is a signal of 
strength. An ineffective and declining level of activity, by contrast, is a 
signal of weakness.53 
Only the population can help the state forces to acquire the necessary resolution 
on insurgents network, that why the feedback mechanism is determined by positive 
behavior of the populace towards state actions against insurgents. In the game of  
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influencing the populace behavior, effectiveness plays a primary role. According with 
McCormick, the effectiveness of the state and counter- state actions can be measured in 
different way: 
Insurgent effectiveness measures the numbers of losses they are able to 
inflict on the state per time period per unit of rebel force. State 
effectiveness, on the other hand, measures the number of rebel losses it is 
able to inflict per time period per potential interaction between the 
opposing forces.54 
3.   The Principle of Political Control  
McCormick says, “Control is an exclusive phenomenon: if you have it, they 
don’t. When you have control over the environment, you can influence the pure 
preferences of the population.”55 Control is the ability to shape behavior through 
selective incentives. Control must be exercised across the breadth and depth of the 
political spectrum. High resolution control means knowing the insurgency down to the 
individual level—knowing where every individual is, what he thinks, what he does. With 
this type of control, manipulation and secrecy are easy. Conversely, the insurgents lose 
the initiative and cannot strike at will. Political control is the key outcome of the Mystic 
Diamond model. Trying to establish the control, the state is also confronting the 
following paradox: 
As the state is successful at reducing the strength of insurgency, it will be 
harder and harder for it to continue to reduce the insurgency at a constant 
rate. This is in stark contrast to most military operations, where success 
enables continued success.56 
When facing a murky situation like an insurgency, the state must clearly identify 
the relevant features of its opponents even before articulating its strategic objectives, 
concepts and allocation of resources. The Mystic Diamond model is an analytic tool 
                                                 
54 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B Horton, Lauren A Harrison, 349. 
55 Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” 2006. 
56 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, Lauren A. Harrison, Things Fall Apart: The Endgame 
Dynamics of Internal Wars, Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, 2007, 349. 
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which identifies both the insurgency’s main features and the dynamic of its evolution. 
Moreover, the model reveals the principles to be followed when implementing an 
effective counterinsurgency strategy. Chapter III analyzes the situation in Iraq through 
the lens of the Mystic Diamond model. 
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III.  ANALYZING THE IRAQI SITUATION THROUGH THE LENS 
OF MYSTIC DIAMOND  
A.  A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY   
After four years of struggle, the situation in Iraq is still highly volatile and 
unstable. The war effort so far can be summarized numerically by several figures: 400 
billion dollars spent in Iraq (around eight billion dollars per month since 2003), 141,000 
combat troops permanently deployed on several major bases, more than 3,400 U.S. 
military deaths. According with the analysis of the Iraq Study Group, 
Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq is rising 
and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making no 
changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at a high cost. 
Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The United States is 
spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to other international 
crises is constrained. This level of expense is not sustainable over an 
extended period, especially when progress is not being made. The longer 
the United States remains in Iraq without progress, the more resentment 
will grow among Iraqis who believe they are subjects of a repressive 
American occupation. As one U.S. official said to us, “Our leaving would 
make it worse. . . . The current approach without modification will not 
make it better.57 
Sectarian violence generates 3500 civilian deaths each month from as many as 
200 insurgent attacks every day. More than three million people (ten percent of the 
population) are refugees in neighboring Jordan, Syria and Iran. The Iraq Study Group, 
states “The United Nations estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 
1.8 million Iraqis have fled the country.”58  
The Mystic Diamond model reveals that in order to achieve success in Iraq, 
several essential conditions must be met, and most importantly they should be related to 
political will, opportunity, and use of an unconventional strategic approach.  
                                                 
57 Baker et al., 37. 
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Political will can be described as a long term commitment to an effective 
counterinsurgency strategy. An analysis in the Washington Post suggests that, “In the 
political test of wills over Iraq, congressional Democrats opposed to the war have public 
opinion on their side and President Bush has enough Republican votes to make his vetoes 
stick. Long term, that's not a winning formula for the White House.”59 Without a firm 
long term political commitment, the debate about a proper counterinsurgency solution is 
useless. The concept of opportunity refers to the time period when the new strategy can 
be implemented for maximum effect with the minimum investment. By losing 
momentum, the cost and the length of time needed for implementation increase 
exponentially.  
Pentagon and other administration staff acknowledge that a moment of 
opportunity was missed immediately after the toppling of Saddam's 
regime: that fleeing chance to restore low and order, maintain the 
momentum, nurture popular support and thus extinguish the inevitable 
seeds of insurgency sown amongst the ousted ruling elite. The coalition 
failed to capitalize the initial success.60 
There was a window of opportunity to implement an unconventional strategy 
between June 2003 and February 2006, when military analysts were confident that 
military reactions from former power elements would have been inconsistent in strength 
and duration. Since then, the insurgency has spread steadily throughout the country.  
The military victory was soured by the lawlessness in the country, by the 
manifest inability of the United States to implement the promised postwar 
reconstruction, and above all by the outbreak of a seemingly unexpected 
insurgency on the part of disgruntled Sunni Arab population in the center 
of the country.61 
The corruption in the administrative system, steady economic decline and 
deterioration of the economic structure, and the weak American involvement in the post-
                                                 
59 David Esposito, “Veto Won't End Iraq Dispute,” Washington Post, 24 April 2007, available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com, accessed 24 April 2007. 
60 Nigel Aylwin Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review, 
November-December 2005, 2.  
61 Hashim, xvi.   
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war investment management and reconstruction all led to increased violence. More than 
ever, religion started to play an essential role in Iraqi life. Ancient rivalries between 
Sunni and Shia emerged and radicalized the country. 
It would be unfair to say that nothing has been accomplished so far. Iraq has a 
democratically elected government and the economy has begun to move in the right 
direction. However, most positive political and social achievements are overshadowed by 
the unprecedented level of violence. At this time, it is difficult to predict a clear outcome 
to the Iraqi conflict; nevertheless the Mystic Diamond model can be used to assess the 
patterns of the insurgency and a feasible response of the state.  
B.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNCONVENTIONAL STRATEGY 
The Mystic Diamond model states that in an unconventional war, the state should 
initially establish legitimate political control over the population and only then to 
continue targeting the insurgent infrastructure and leadership. The state cannot strike the 
infrastructure between the insurgency and population, until this connection becomes 
visible; the same can be said for state efforts to disrupt the infrastructure between 
insurgents and their external support. The insurgents cannot be seen until the state 
establishes effective control over the population and consequently influences the 
population's behavior. The state also must win the legitimacy struggle within the 
population and the international arena. As it establishes control, it can gradually shift 
towards the second objective and third objective (targeting the infrastructure and the core 
of insurgents’ organization, as it is illustrated in Figure 12).62 
Although between 2004 and 2006, the focus at the strategic and operational level 
was on combat operations, in order to kill and capture insurgents and terrorists, at the 
tactical level there are some examples of correct implementation of counterinsurgency 
steps. 
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In Iraq as well, Marine units being deployed there in early 2004 had 
similarly been planning to position themselves among the population in 
their area of operations-including in the notorious Sunni Triangle. In 
tactics reminiscent of the Combined Actions Platoons of the Vietnam War, 
a marine officer responsible for planning explained that the “idea is that 
this Platoon, similar to Vietnam, will live and work with the Police and 
ICDC [Iraqi Civil Defense Corps].”63  
However, these results vanished over time due to the discontinuity of the process, 
generated by continuous rotation of troops on the ground, unfulfilled Iraqi expectations, 
degradation of economic-social life, and rapid regeneration of the insurgency.64 
Some of these commanders have paid close attention to lessons learned 
over the years [about countering insurgency] and are applying them in 
theatre but it is not division or battalion wide. It often is up to the 
individual commanders. For instance the 2BCT Baghdad of the 1AD here 
is doing it 3 different ways dependent upon the commander of the 
individual unit. One is using lots of low level intelligence ideas coupled 
with a get on the ground approach that is playing high dividends. The 
other two don’t care and just go about business as usual.65 
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Figure 12.   The Strategic Steps to be Implemented by the State in Counterinsurgency. 
 
Source: Professor Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerilla Warfare” class, 2006. 
 
In Iraq case, the Mystic Diamond model demonstrates why the sequence of 
actions implemented by the state/coalition was improper, and misunderstood. The control 
of political space was wrongly seen by the leaders as a less important aspect of the 
conflict. 
The most basic function of any government is to provide security to its 
people. That the Iraqi government is currently failing at this task in large 
areas of the country reduces the Iraqi population's willingness and ability 







legitimacy, hinders the political process, and derails reconstruction. It is 
the single most serious problem in Iraq today. Yet coalition forces have 
not stepped in to fill the security gap.66 
It becomes clear that in Iraq the primary focus of coalition forces was placed on 
third implementation step (direct combat actions against insurgents, having the objective 
to kill, neutralize, and disrupt them). If the proper sequence of implementation steps is 
not understood and implemented by the state/coalition, then the insurgents can not be 
isolated from the populace. Which are the arguments to support this hypothesis? One is 
that the necessary bond and control over the population has never been truly established 
throughout Iraq. Independent recent surveys in Iraq, indicate the unfavorable position of 
coalition forces in the preference of Iraqi population.  
That the American presence and mission are untenable should be clear 
from the fact that Iraqis readily blame the coalition, directly or indirectly, 
for most of their current difficulties, including the rise in communal 
violence and crime. A September 2006 poll of Iraqi public opinion found 
that 79 percent of Iraqis think the United States is having a mostly 
negative effect on the country; 78 percent think that the U.S. military is 
provoking more conflict than it is preventing. A “hearts and minds” 
campaign cannot be won under these circumstances.67 
Along this line, polls from Zogby International show that many Iraqis consider 
U.S. withdrawal the optimal way to reduce the level of violence.  
Especially in Sunni and Shia areas where U.S. troops mostly operate Iraqis 
do not trust the coalition and want U.S. troops to leave soon. The 
September 2006 poll found 71 percent of all Iraqis favoring withdrawal by 
September 2007. Among Sunnis the proportion wanting withdrawal was 
91 percent; among Shia, 74 percent. Most disturbing, support among 
Iraqis for attacks on coalition forces registered at 61 percent in the 
September 2006 poll up from 47 percent in January 2006. Among Shia, 
support for attacks is 62 percent; among Sunnis, 92 percent.68  
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Adherents pushed to violence by their code of honor, pride, nationalism and 
revenge are increasingly effective at disrupting ordinary life and attacking the symbols of 
power:  
The power and appeal of “rejections” among Sunnis and Shia alike derive 
from the fact of the American occupation. The negative aura that 
surrounds the American presence also touches and tarnishes the Iraqi 
government, which is presently dependent on American power. And, 
because that government is dominated by Kurdish and Shia parties, the 
impression that it is “collaborationist” feeds communal tensions.69  
A related shortcoming of the U.S. strategy is the failure to “clear and hold” the 
areas—in other words, lack of authoritative control over the general population, the 
ethnic groups, and the armed factions.70 The Pentagon declared that most of the 
operations from 2004 through 2007 were “mop-up operations” designed to kill or capture 
insurgents or terrorist leaders. Even though, the current U.S. War Strategy for Iraq, 
prioritize the strategic goals in the following sequence:  
Clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive; killing and 
capturing enemy fighters; denying them safe haven; hold areas freed from 
enemy control with an adequate Iraqi security force presence; build Iraqi 
Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services; 
advance the rule of law; and nurture civil society.71 
Secondly, the distribution of U.S. forces in Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad, is 
currently designed to control the vital points, not to establish a network of forces against 
insurgency. For example, in Baghdad, the coalition forces are concentrated in 6 major 
military bases (strongholds), from where they lunch “sweep up operations” on daily 
basis, again with the clear intent to capture and kill the insurgents, and then returns to 
their strongholds. 
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Figure 13.   Major U.S. Bases in Baghdad. 
 
Source: www.globalsecurityorganization.com / military maps 
 
Baghdad is a large city having more than 6 millions inhabitants, and by leaving 
uncontrolled the large interval between these bases, a twofold result occurring: (1) the 
bond between the state and the population is not created; (2) the space in-between is 
rapidly flooded with insurgents when U.S. or Iraqi troops return to their garrisons.72 In 
many circumstances, the clearing operations were effective, but the holding and building 
phases have not been implemented as planned. In this way, most military operations have 
had a temporary effect.  
                                                 
72 Gordon McCormick, comments in NPS graduate “Seminar on Guerilla Warfare,” 2006. 
 53
After failing to visualize the conditions of combat in Iraq, America's 
generals failed to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency. 
Counterinsurgency theory prescribes providing continuous security to the 
population. However, for most of the war American forces in Iraq have 
been concentrated on large forward-operating bases, isolated from the 
Iraqi people and focused on capturing or killing insurgents.73 
Although, thousands of insurgents have been captured or killed, the evidence on 
the ground shows that the number of insurgents remains constant and the number of 
attacks on the coalition forces and ISF has grown. A complicated and divided political 
situation on the ground results mostly from sectarian cleansing, which increased the 
numbers of Shia and Sunni insurgents. This illustrates the opposing forces' high level of 
regeneration, which cannot be stopped simply by targeting leaders and some operatives.  
The third argument which sustains the fact that the coalition was unable to control 
the population is given by the ascendant trend of the insurgency. 
Having presented these arguments, it becomes futile to present any other 
achievements of the state regarding the steps 2, 2’, and 3- (targeting insurgents, 
infrastructure and core- see Figure 12). These achievements alone can not break the 
insurgency regeneration cycle. Without achieving the isolation of insurgents from the 
population the source of insurgency growth is not eliminated.74 This is also the critical 
observation in this chapter. The immediate effect of not implementing the correct 
sequence of the strategic steps (as widely described in Chapter II), allows the unrestricted 
regeneration of insurgency, which in the long run will influence the behavior of 
population and the outcome of the war. 
C. INSURGENTS STRATEGIES 
In contrast with the coalition forces, the insurgents implemented intuitively the 
right sequence of necessary steps against the state. They are controlling large populated 
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area (example of Sunni triangle),75 where they organize and build their network. Based 
on a constant flow of inputs from population and external support, they launch 
coordinated attacks against state infrastructure and symbols, and against coalition forces. 
Through the manipulation of the violent images, the insurgents achieve three main 
effects. Firstly, they use with success the violence as an instrument of armed 
propaganda.76 The effectiveness of this propaganda, on internal and external audiences is 
profound, the Iraqi population is divided. The U.S. population and congress have moved 
towards a near term exit of U.S. forces from Iraq. The second effect of symbolic violence 
used by insurgents is the provocation effect. Violence is used by insurgents to provoke 
the state into engaging in excessive countermeasures in an effort to improve the relative 
image of the insurgency.77 Coalition forces in Iraq, responds to the volatile situation with 
all available conventional means, including overwhelming firepower. The side effect of 
uncontrolled targeting is a large number of collateral casualties which, is fueling the 
“fire” of the insurgency.  
By showing the inability of state and coalition forces to provide essential needs to 
population, the insurgents are weakening the position of state. In this case, violence is 
used for the purpose of generating an exaggerated impression of insurgents’ strength and 
regime weakness.78 
Spectacular acts of violence, such suicide bombings that have rocked Iraq 
since August, are meant to demoralize the population and undermine trust 
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the fundamental asymmetry of the insurgency/counterinsurgency dynamic 
comes into play: The guerrillas do not have to defeat their opponents 
militarily; they just have to avoid losing.79   
D. THE NECESSITY OF STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT 
The complex Iraqi situation requires a comprehensive long term solution. In order 
to recalibrate the current strategy to the dynamics of insurgency, the state has to adjust its 
strategic objectives, or its concepts/ways and means/resources for achieving its stated 
goals. Lately, it becomes more evident that the war strategy in Iraq did not keep the pace 
with the dynamics of insurgency.80 Thus, the initial objectives, concepts/ways and means 
became obsolete. Second, the approach to the conflict was opposite of the algorithm 
proposed by the Mystic Diamond model. Forces were tasked to solve an unconventional 
problem with their own conventional means and doctrine, instead of following the logic 
of identifying the problem, defining the solution, and task-organizing the proper package 
of forces in the revised sequence.81  
In Iraq, the conventional vision is present in planning phase, implementation 
phase, task-organization the forces, conduct of combat operations, and even in training 
conception of ISF. One of the Mystic Diamond principles, states that in the 
unconventional approach, the state should use low profile, flatly distributed forces, as a 
spearhead of counterinsurgency effort, having a constant support from a flexible rapid 
reaction conventional force.  
He began by having enough troops. Petraeus’ counterinsurgency field 
manual calls for at least 20 combat troops for every 1,000 civilians, and in 
Mosul, with 20,000 Screaming Eagles, Petraeus had the manpower to 
establish an overwhelming presence on the streets. Just as important in 
Petraeus’ doctrine, though, is how those troops conduct themselves. 
Unlike regular [conventional] warfare, counterinsurgency requires 
“nuanced” and “empathetic” soldiering, Petraeus writes in his field 
manual. “The more force used,” he writes, “the less effective it is.” Or as 
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Petraeus put in an interview, “You’re not going to kill your way out of an 
insurgency.” His soldiers in Mosul were instructed to think of themselves 
more as a community police force than a conquering army. Soldiers 
patrolled on foot when possible, rather than in armored vehicles. Back at 
the barracks, Petraeus had posters put up asking soldiers, “WHAT HAVE 
YOU DONE TO WIN IRAQI HEARTS AND MINDS TODAY?”82  
This is not happening in Iraq, and so far both conventional and Special Forces, do 
not have the necessary guidance to work unconventionally and build up the necessary 
bond with the population and local forces. The United States' symmetric response to 
insurgent attacks is intended to buy time, so the ISF can develop the combat skills 
necessary to fight the insurgency. In theory when ISF are ready to take over, the 
handover of responsibility should be in effect. 
We will increase our forces in Baghdad by 21,500 personnel to give our 
commanders an enhanced ability to hold previously cleared 
neighborhoods. The ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] are also reinforcing the 
capital with three additional brigades. Prime Minister Maliki has 
established a Baghdad Security Command with 10 Security Framework 
Districts, with an Iraqi brigade, partnered with a U.S. battalion.83 
In many ways the handover towards Iraqi Security Forces, (which by the way is a 
newly emerged organization far less effective than the former better homogenized Iraqi 
army), has several flaws. ISF have been trained only in conventional fashion to deal with 
conventional threats. At national level only a single Special Operation Brigade is active, 
and closer to an unconventional profile.  
To date, the U.S. has trained and equipped about 307,800 Iraqi army and 
police forces, up from 196,600 a year ago. But three years into the war, 
these Iraqi forces don't seem to be improving fast enough to curb surging 
violence. Daily attacks in Iraq have risen to record levels, and attrition 
among Iraqi forces remains high. In areas like the restive al Anbar 
Province, Iraqi units have, on average, only 55% of the soldiers they are 
supposed to, senior U.S. military officials say.84 
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Moreover, the police forces, which should play the major role in 
counterinsurgency, are less trained and equipped and are constantly confronting the 
ethnical cleansing issue, which is a major obstacle when implementing any kind of 
constructive strategy.  
Despite ISF progress, the ISF attrition rate remains very high, due to factors like 
lack of leadership, lack of proper communications and poor force protection. Since the 
first Iraqi Army combat units entered service in November 2003, more than 20,000 
personnel have been killed, severely wounded, or have left the Army.85 According to 
counterinsurgency doctrine the emphasis should be on having the police forces develop 
the expertise to create a network that can disrupt the insurgents' network.  
Demonstrated by the Shia, the ISF is not yet ready to take control in the contested 
areas without targeting the Sunni minority. The report to Congress on stability and 
security in Iraq says, “The influence exerted by Shia militia members within the Ministry 
of Interior is troubling. Militia influence affects every component of the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI), particularly in Baghdad and several key cities.”86 
The handover should not be done before the ISF achieves the appropriate level of 
combat effectiveness, and impartiality. However, as time passes, U.S. commanders have 
become more eager to handover the situation to ISF. As Kagan notes, “Coalition strategy 
has tended to focus on minimizing the role of coalition troops in handling the insurgency 
and pushing indigenous forces into the front of the fight, sometimes even when they were 
unprepared for such a role.”87 
Therefore, the transition of responsibility from coalition forces to Iraqi security 
forces, presents a major flaw. The Iraqi Security Forces have too few operational units to 
deal with a vast insurgency. Moreover, the forces ready so far are not trained in  
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counterinsurgency techniques but mostly in conventional urban fighting, which does not 
necessary imply the establishment of political control over population in cleared areas. In 
fact, they created more insurgents than they eliminated. 
To sum up, it would be proper to acknowledge that conventional forces would 
still play an important role in counter-insurgency. Nevertheless, their primary mission 
would be to support a more flexible, low-profile constabulary type of force, which would 
have the necessary ability to tailor its response according with the level of threat.  
Therefore, one can assert that in Iraq the strategic means of implementation are 
not tailored to the profile of the conflict. Moreover, the necessary set of unconventional 
skills present within coalition forces, are often the exception and not the rule. 
Any readjusting process of the strategic objectives, concepts and means has not 
been effective. By direct targeting the core of the insurgency the state/coalition forces 
failed to apply the correct sequence of counterinsurgency implementation steps as 
described by Mystic Diamond Model. According with Mystic Diamond Model the 
correct implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy should spread from outside in, 
and not, as currently, from inside out. The process should start from already secured and 
stabilized areas diffusing sequentially towards to the center. But, the current strategy has 
been focusing on stabilizing and securing Baghdad and Sunni Triangle (the center). If the 
more stable and peripheral areas are progressing due to the proper implementation of UW 
strategy, than the example for other more troubled areas, is set, and easier to export from 
“outside- in.” On the contrary, when the coalition forces engage the enemy 
simultaneously in the most volatile areas, but fail to implement security, then the only 
thing exported from “inside- out,” would be the insurgency itself. 
1. The Principle of Mutual Exclusion  
The mutual exclusion principle developed in the Mystic Diamond model allows 
identification of the multidimensional profile of counter-state actors and their hidden 
agendas. Scrutinizing the objectives and political motivation of the various insurgency  
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actors in Iraq, one can visualize the dynamic struggle for political power and control over 
the population. The diversity of counter-state factions makes it difficult to implement a 
rigid strategy and calls for a tailored, flexible approach.88   
The Mystic Diamond Model explains is how the insurgency is organized, 
controlled and commanded by its leadership. It is already stated that the incipient 
structure has similar characteristics with a network or even a “network of networks.” In 
Iraq the insurgent organization is based on decentralization in order to ensure the 
survivability of the movement. The Iraqi insurgency is a flat type of organization, having 
loose command and control, and highly compartmentalized cells. Also, recent history 
reveals that insurgency leadership is found mostly in elite segments of the population. 
Iraq is no exception to the rule that experience and leadership skills are required to 
organize insurgency. The former Ba'athist assured the appropriate flexible structure 
necessary to accommodate of the emerging anti-coalition doctrinal views. Hence, 
Hasshim writes, “It didn’t take long for Iraq's Sunni Arabs to overcome their initial shock 
at the collapse of the Ba'athist regime and begin to show their displeasure, because they 
saw themselves as the target of the invasion.”89 
The demographics of the insurgency are broadly distributed, with highly diverse 
agendas, motives, political objectives, organizational structures, religious support and 
external support that make difficult any standardized approach. The competition for 
controlling the political space is often producing violence and chaos.90 
Illegally armed groups are engaged in a self-sustaining cycle of sectarian and 
politically motivated violence, using tactics that include indiscriminate bombing, murder, 
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violence is focused on local issues, such as sectarian, political, and economic control of 
Baghdad; Kurdish, Arab, and Turkomen aspirations for Kirkuk; and the political and 
economic control of Shi’a regions in the south.91  
The political compromise and acceptance of Moqtada al-Sadr as a “necessary 
evil” in the Iraqi political arena had a devastating second order effect on stability. 
Moqtada al-Sadr exercised the power of his network through various means, including 
rewards, coerciveness, terror, legitimacy claims, and informational advantage. 
Moqtada al-Sadr has a large following among impoverished Shia, 
particularly in Baghdad. He has joined Maliki’s governing coalition, but 
his Mahdi Army has clashed with the Badr Brigades, as well as with Iraqi, 
U.S., and U.K. forces. Sadr claims to be an Iraqi nationalist. Several 
observers remarked to us that Sadr was following the model of Hezbollah 
in Lebanon: building a political party that controls basic services within 
the government and an armed militia outside of the government.92 
The competition for political control later resulted in the al-Sadr wing's self-
exclusion from the government decision forum. Thus, one can observe how the Mystic 
Diamond model of mutual exclusion extends from the simple equation of “state versus 
counter-state” to a multidimensional representation of “state versus competing counter-
state entities.” Different motives along with the opportunistic struggle for power establish 
conditions for insurgency. There are plenty of motives, ranging from pure revenge to 
sectarian cleansing to extremist Jihad revisionism. Jihad extremism is an important 
constant external influence.  
The participation of foreign fighters and transnational Islamist groups 
extends beyond Iraq and is not merely concerned with the saving of Iraq 
as a national entity, but with the defense of the Islam.93  
In this context, Al-Qaeda exploits any grievances between Sunni and Shia to 
maintain a volatile environment and manipulate the population to its advantage. 
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Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq, but that 
includes some of the more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, large truck 
bombs, and attacks on significant religious or political targets. Al Qaeda in 
Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of Sunni Arabs. Foreign 
fighters— numbering an estimated 1,300—play a supporting role or carry 
out suicide operations. Al Qaeda’s goals include instigating a wider 
sectarian war between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia, and driving the United States 
out of Iraq. Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi civilian 
casualties. Iraq is in the grip of a deadly cycle: Sunni insurgent attacks 
spark large-scale Shia reprisals, and vice versa.94 
To summarize this section of counter-state actors, the complex situation in Iraq 
conflict shows the necessity of a new multifaceted approach. The real battle in the long 
run is to shape the public's pure preference and support in favor of stability and peace.95  
2.  Insurgency Conversion Mechanism  
The side effect of the strategy in Iraq has unwillingly boosted the insurgency to 
the point when the insurgent-controlled political space is large enough to assure the 
smooth conversion of inputs (people, guns, money) into outputs, further expanding the 
movement. Diverse domestic and foreign groups rally around the general objective of 
defeating the coalition and the new government. Endogenous support is the most 
important. key variable.96 The disbanded Iraq army, intelligence officials and Ba'ath 
party operatives used a prearranged guerilla logistical system (endogenous inputs) to 
launch a large scale offensive. Exogenous support is provided by various Muslim fighters 
and groups from the Middle East, Africa and Europe. The United States and Prime 
Minister Maliki have publicly condemned the lethal Iranian support to Shi’a militias as 
well as the Syrian provision of safe haven to some Iraqi insurgents, especially former 
Saddam-era Iraqi Ba’ath party members.97 Again, according to the model presented in 
the previous chapter, if the state fails to build legitimacy with international supporters and  
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fails to cut off external support, the insurgency can maintain the level of symbolic 
violence.98 In Iraq, the inputs are both internal and external sources and have been proven 
difficult for the state to prevent and interdict. 
Neither guns nor dedicated fighters are scarce in Iraq. The Pentagon 
estimates the number of hard-core enemy fighters to be roughly 10,000 
(20,000 if active sympathizers and covert accomplices are included). And 
Iraq is awash in assault rifles, ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades and 
explosives—the lifeblood of insurgency. ... [T]he guerrillas enjoy support 
from a sizable fraction of the population in the Sunni heartland.99 
Insurgents use their networks, structure and experience to transform all available 
inputs into effective outputs designed to shake the population's confidence in the 
government's ability to provide security, order, and life's necessities. According to the 
Mystic Diamond model, there are two main types of outputs: direct attacks and 
infrastructure attacks. In Iraq, direct attacks are aimed against coalition and state elements 
and supporters; the same methods are used to settle sectarian and ethnic disputes. 
Infrastructure attacks are also common. Conetta describes the political objectives pursued 
by insurgency outputs as follows: 
1. Terrorist attacks. Car bombs, mortar attacks, snipers, etc. These attacks 
have a high return early in the process of destabilization. The media 
coverage is intense and the public is psychologically traumatized. The 
nascent government’s reaction is often harsh which serves to alienate the 
people. 2. Targeted killings (assassinations). These attacks, particularly if 
focused on relief or reconstruction organizations, can have an immediate 
and long-lasting impact on state recovery. It can break apart national 
coalitions and cause the withdrawal of companies and organizations that 
are critical to reconstruction. These attacks can also be used to dissuade 
participation in the government. 3. Infrastructure disruption (network 
attack). These attacks are the bread and butter of global guerrilla 
operations. It deprives the emergent government of the ability to deliver 
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particularly in the case of Iraq, deprives the government of funds 
necessary for reconstruction and ongoing security. The rate of return from 
these attacks is by far the highest of all attack types.100 
The fact the insurgency is regenerating with a higher tempo than the rate of 
attrition imposed by coalition forces is suggesting two things. The internal and external 
inputs are too abundant, and the flow couldn’t be stopped so far. Secondly the conversion 
mechanism is highly effective producing coordinated attacks on daily basis and large 
scale. 
E. A FINAL ASSESSMENT 
To sum up, the U.S. strategy in Iraq was not sufficiently envisioned and prepared 
by coalition political leadership. Along the way, the strategy was not adjusted according 
to the ground reality. The same concepts and resources have been used to deal with 
changing threats. The political decisions amplified the internal tensions culminating with 
the proposed calendar for withdraw of troops from Iraq by March 2008. The House 
resolution calls on President Bush to announce by year's end a plan for a withdrawal from 
Iraq that would begin by October 1, 2007.101 
Analyzing the Iraq situation through the lens of the Mystic Diamond model leads 
to several assessments.  
First one is the incorrect sequence of steps applied by the state / coalition, which 
first engaged in direct action, in order to achieve a swift and definitive solution. On the 
contrary, the proper sequence requires the establishing of physical and political control 
over the population first. Only after this important step has been achieved then the 
necessary resolution on insurgent’s infrastructure takes shape, and create the conditions 
to isolate and neutralize the insurgents.102 The brutal competition among factions to 
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control the same political arena makes it more difficult to achieve political consensus to 
stabilize Iraq. Scrutinizing the Iraqi situation with the help of concepts presented in 
Mystic Diamond model makes it easy to recognize the importance of controlling the 
population and interdicting external support. At the tactical level, whenever these two 
conditions were met, the pockets of insurgency were easily isolated and destroyed. The 
battles in Falluja, Al Anbar and Sadr city are eloquent evidence of temporary tactical 
victories.  
The second conclusion refers to the “diffusion direction.” According with Mystic 
Diamond Model, the correct implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy should 
spread from “outside in,” and not, as currently, done from “inside out.” The process 
should start from already secured and stabilized areas diffusing sequentially towards to 
the center. Additionally, the reconstruction effort was uneven distributed accentuating the 
grievances between ethnic or sectarian groups. U.S. openly supported specific ethnic or 
sectarian groups (Kurds or Shia) in detriment of others (Sunni). This resulted in an acute 
radicalization of the country.  
When analyzing the means and resources designed to implement the strategic 
goals, it is clear that the conventional approach of the state and coalition forces in dealing 
with insurgency has not produced the expected results. Simply by providing more 
conventional forces to train more conventional Iraqi forces in a conventional manner, will 
not resolve the situation. Perhaps the emphasis should be on having the police forces 
develop the expertise to create a network that can disrupt the insurgents' network. 
Conventional forces should be limited to a rapid response role focused on dealing with 
large scale insurgent attacks. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
So far, this thesis has analyzed and explored the Iraqi insurgency characteristics 
using the theoretical framework of Mystic Diamond Model. Further, the attempt is to 
magnify on requirements necessary to adjust the actual strategic approach in Iraq. Then, 
it is acknowledge that for any durable economical development Iraq needs stability and 
security. All analysts of Iraqi conflict agree that security is a sine qua non condition for 
any future reconstruction effort. That why, this chapter is focusing on the military 
strategy in Iraq, and explore another available option to be considered by present and 
future politico-military decision makers.  
A. WHAT DOES IT REQUIRE FOR THE U.S. TO ADOPT AN 
UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH IN IRAQ? 
First, if the present political trend precipitates with a complete withdrawal from 
Iraq, such withdrawal would provoke negative long term consequences on regional 
security and disrupt the geopolitical balance. Therefore, it should be evident that a 
complete withdrawal option would be an impulsive decision with negative consequences.  
Second, if the actual conventional approach is not stabilizing the country and 
solving the problems, politicians should also consider an unconventional approach to the 
war in Iraq. Certainly, one of the key requirements in adjusting the strategy towards an 
unconventional approach is the political will and commitment.  
It can be asserted that there are “no silver bullets” because the solution has 
multiple-segments: political, diplomatic, social, military, religious. Ultimately, there are 
two options in order to build trust in victory and effectively deal with insurgency in Iraq – 
either a conventional or an unconventional strategical approach. Up to now the 
conventional option did not bring the trust and confidence in a final, definitive victory 
over the destabilizing factors in Iraq. 
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Once we have established the trust, we will find easier to gather the 
intelligence we need to fight terrorism, because we will have entered the 
human world where terrorists live and operate. As we build trust, we will 
also build our influence. As e build our influence and increase our 
intelligence, these efforts will begin to reinforce one another.103 
Therefore, there are different ways of building trust, and each of them should be 
employed according with the profile and objective of a specific actor. In Iraq the main 
actors are not only the state/coalition forces and the insurgents but also different ethnic 
groups competing for political power. In this attempt, the Coalition should consider 
specific ways of building trust focusing on calculus used trust, deterrence based trust, 
knowledge based trust, and identity based trust.  
According with professor Denning, there is a variety of trust defined as follows: 
Calculus used trust takes place when trustier see that it is in personal 
interest of trusted to be trust. 
Deterrence based trust takes shape where you lay especially in the fact that 
trusted will be punished in case he was wrong. 
Knowledge based trust can be build by knowing somebody for a very long 
time and having a lot of experience in dealing with that person. 
Identity based trust (agents of accountability) happens when you got a 
common sense of identity – same unit, team, and branch – sharing same 
expectation, goals, objectives, etc.104 
By applying those concepts to Iraq, the following can be further asserted. 
Calculus used trust can be translated through the creation of a common 
interest/objective for the main political forces in Iraq in order to reach a political 
consensus, as a primary step towards stability. 
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Deterrence based trust – or reaffirming the commitment of coalition forces to 
track down and destroy all terrorist and insurgents’ network in Iraq, without establishing 
exit milestones. 
Knowledge based trust – the forces on the ground have to display a constant and 
continuous level of professionalism, objectivism, and cultural awareness and to maintain 
the relations established with the local leaders and population (special skills to deal with 
insurgency in Iraq). 
Identity based trust – being created between U.S. forces and ISF by sharing the 
same expectation, goals, and objectives, in order to secure and stabilize the country. 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) represents a classically indirect, and 
ultimately local, approach to waging warfare. To work with indigenous 
forces, the SOF must win their trust. To do this, they live with them, eat 
with them, and share the same living conditions. They also take the 
opportunity to study local practices and learn social preferences. Building 
trust invariably takes time, but the payoff come in a better understanding 
of the operational environment and the ability to solicit the kid of solid 
intelligence that enables operations.105 
Acknowledging the fact that trust has several variables such as credibility, 
commitment, confidence, cooperation, reciprocity, and satisfaction, it becomes evident 
that trust influences perception and determines the future specific behavior of the 
population. The supporting argument is that in an unpredictable environment, trust can 
make the difference between the victory and defeat. 
Trusting becomes the crucial strategy for dealing with an uncertainty and 
uncontrollable future. Trust is a simplify strategy that enables individuals 
to adapt to complex environment and thereby benefit from increase 
opportunity.106  
Professor Arquilla, argues that the most efficient way to disrupt a network is to 
undermine the trust structure. Going for physical destruction will accelerate the  
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regeneration process, if the network does not have a hierarchical structure. Conventional 
wars are design to fight nations, but other methods are required when you fight a flat type 
of terrorist network with global reach.  
How do you attack a trust structure -- which is what a network is? You're 
not going to do this with Tomahawk missiles or strategic bombardment. 
It's a whole new playing field. You're not attacking a nation, but a 
network.107 
The regeneration process directly influenced the trust in their potential for victory 
over coalition/government forces, and as a second order effect impacted the undecided 
segment of the population. This survivability of insurgents produced the shifting of 
undecided segments preferences towards insurgent movement. 
In translating this concept to the Iraq situation we can assert that the direct 
influence of trust in victory, works for or against several areas such: psycho - moral; 
deterrence; population support; and cohesion within the coalition forces. 
Because of the highly ethnical distributed segments of populations in his 
AO (Sunni, Shia, orthodox), Col Baker, commander of 2nd Combat 
Brigade in Baghdad, realized that any effective message towards these 
segments should be clear, concise, repeated but orientated to the profile of 
the specific segment. Another interesting observation was that his own 
troops constitute a target audience, in order to maintain the dynamic of 
information campaign, and to build the bridge between operatives on the 
ground and local. Soon he realized that in order to focus his target 
audience, he has to classify the target audience in three separate segments- 
the true believers the hard core, the undecided and the pro-coalition 
segments. Then, regarding local population, the focus was on undecided 
segment.108 
It is worth to mention that in order to adapt the counterinsurgency strategy of 
Mystic Diamond Model should followed the logic of: identifying the problem, defining 
the solution, and after that, task-organize the package of forces. 
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An essential requirement for a long lasting solution in Iraq, as already described 
by Mystic Diamond Model, is to implement the right sequence of actions/operations: 
initially the state has to establish the legitimate political control over the population, and 
only then to continue targeting the insurgency infrastructure and leadership.  
For these delicate missions coalition forces should use specialized trained and 
skilled forces having a dual role: creating a symmetric network to counter the insurgency 
influence over the population, and prepare the legacy force for the future. In this scenario 
it is clear that the package of surrogate forces (unconventional forces) should play the 
primary role being supported by a flexible and rapid package of conventional forces. This 
concept implies also a profound comprehension of an efficient counterinsurgency 
strategy, at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Therefore, the profile of the forces is 
not only important but also the structure of command and control which is directing the 
overarching doctrine. 
Conventional generals are trained to maneuver large forces in major 
ground and air operations and therefore seek to employ their forces in 
ways that do what large conventional forces do best: they seek large-scale 
operations designed to find, fix and destroy enemy forces. 
Unfortunately, guerrillas (insurgents) generally have the operational 
ability not to allow themselves either to be found or fixed in significant 
numbers unless they want to be. Grudgingly, conventional generals 
eventually abandon large maneuver operations in favor of patrols and raids 
by small units, but this operations, while more effective tactically, do not 
produce the desired result unless they are part of an effective 
counterinsurgency strategy.109  
Nevertheless, the military strategy in Iraq should be only one segment of the 
solution package. Without economic and social reforms, political and ethnical 
reconciliation, and external support, the term for real achievements could be postponed 
indefinitely. 
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B.  SPECIAL OPERATION – COUNTERINSURGENCY RESPONSE 
Despite Special Operation Community awareness of the current status quo, there 
are no dramatic proposals for radical changes in strategies, doctrines, and training 
regarding waging conflict in Iraq, but everybody agrees there is a need for change. What 
may be needed is either a different way of waging war, a different task organization or 
different reallocation of forces and resources.  
Therefore, it is important to design the future force structure according with the 
profile of unconventional warfare.  
Te aim of an UW capability is to work by, with, and through indigenous 
personnel over the long term. They would develop long-term, long 
standing person-to person relations. Their presence and expertise would 
provide a permanent, trustworthy ear to the ground to ultimately capture or 
kill “high value targets” through either local military or police operations 
or as a result of U.S. military operations.110 
There is also a need for a conceptual transition of SOF from more traditional 
conventional type of mission, like direct action, special reconnaissance, and combating 
terrorism to unconventional doctrine. 
These commando like activities are close to the conventional model of war 
fighting and have great appeal, and thus tend to consume a 
disproportionate amount of attention and training time, they are high 
visibility, immediate-gratification missions, well within the comfort zone 
and easily identified with by both conventional force and SOE. But 
conventional forces can often perform the same missions.111 
The argument of this section takes into consideration unconventional forces 
(Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations) as the back bone of a new 
and proper organization to address the Iraqi conflict. Changes of waging modern 
unconventional warfare are necessary in order to achieve long term results. These 
changes are regarded as: commitment of proper forces, multiplication of internal defense, 
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an irregular thinking revolution, decentralization of command and control, and a 
profound understanding of a dual – political and military leadership (matrix-network type 
of organization).  
An ideal U.S. strategic response in an asymmetric conflict therefore 
demands two central elements: (1) preparation of public expectations for a 
long war despite U.S. technological and material advantages, and (2) the 
development and deployment of armed forces specifically equipped and 
trained for COIN operations. Without a national consensus and realistic 
expectations, the United States would be politically vulnerable in an 
asymmetric conflict. Without more special operations forces—the self-
reliant and discriminate armed forces necessary to implement an ideal 
COIN strategy—what begins as a military operation against an isolated 
violent minority will tend to escalate into a war against an entire 
people.112 
If the United States, in other words, is to win future “boxing matches” 
against lightweight opponents who use their own version of the rope-a-
dope, it will need fighters with more initiative than discipline, and more 
endurance than punching power.113 
Today, in Iraq U.S. forces use a conventional approach, therefore Special Forces 
are subordinated to a larger conventional campaign (similar to the Vietnam War 
approach). And this conventional approach (based on find, fix and destroy) has been 
proved so far ineffective and very difficult to control. 
U.S. Soldiers and Marines cannot defeat an insurgency using essentially 
the same strategy we employed unsuccessfully in Vietnam – conducting 
operations to find, fix, and destroy groups of insurgents hiding among a 
generally passive, if not supportive, population.114  
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Although, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are experiencing a new 
transformation process as it is outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Report 2006 (QDR 
06), there is still a tendency of SOF community to focus on short term violent type of 
missions (known as direct actions).  
The development of special operations forces focused on conducting 
direct action, foreign internal defense, counterterrorist operations and 
unconventional warfare.115 
Along this line some experts in unconventional field assert that U.S. Special 
Forces are not used at the maximum potential, subsequently being subordinated to 
conventional geographical commanders who perceive the special operators as support 
tool for general conventional plan. 
Building relations however is critical to generating the kind of intelligence 
needed so that hunter-killer teams can strike accurately and effectively. To 
build these relations in the way they are built throughout most of the world 
requires us to do things in a manner significantly different from the way 
DA teams operate and the way SOF’s UW capability is currently used.116 
The need for a conceptual transition from conventional to unconventional is 
evident and widely accepted by Special Operation Forces community but mostly at the 
theoretical level. Practically, this transition is more difficult to be achieved because 
requires innovation within military institutions. That is led by thinking leadership. 
Investment in UW technologies and the creation of the force and staff to understand 
correctly the process are required. Nevertheless, the reluctance within the DoD is slowing 
down the process or even to reverse it. 
In other words, unconventional warfare requires a different mental 
framework as well as unique tactical skills. Recruiting, training, and 
ultimately employing elite warriors is not sufficient for winning wars. The 
realm of modern strategy has been reluctant to accept the unique of 
unconventional warfare and to avoid conventionalizing the  
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unconventional. The SOF has sufficient tactical doctrine and manuals to 
tradecraft. What is lacking is relevant strategic theory for exploiting the 
skills of the Special Forces warrior.117 
C.  SKILLS REQUIRED FOR THE FORCE IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT 
THE UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH  
Today it is equally important to defeat the enemy with minimum casualties on 
both sides; to gain internal and external legitimacy; and to create long lasting solutions by 
eliminating the sources of instability in Iraq. Having these objectives the required force 
for implementation should have specific characteristics: flexible structure, adaptable 
command and control, decentralized authority and initiative down to the tactical level, 
and continuous logistic support. 
This military force should be characterized by high mobility and versatility, cost 
effectiveness, an integrated intelligence network and being capable of projecting precise 
and discriminate strikes. Obviously, the personnel should be skillfully trained and 
experienced, have a decent cultural awareness about the area of operation, and strong 
civil affair and PHSYOPS abilities. So far, these characteristics are matching in many 
respects the profile of a Joint Task Special Operation Force (JTSOF). 
Not only that part of the solution is the permanent presence on the ground for a 
prolonged tour, but also a smooth and elaborated transition between the units in order to 
ensure the continuity and maintenance of the relations between the community and the 
force. Any informational network has important nodes (insurgency leadership) defined as 
“hubs,” “gatekeepers” and “pulsetakers,” which are critical in influencing the 
population. 
The force on the ground should be able to rapidly identify these nodes, using 
actionable intelligence and an instant access to an extensive integrated database network. 
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The cultural awareness and mutual respect, necessary in the relation with locals, 
combined with a specific mixed of incentives and punishments, should lead to the 
elimination of conflict of interests between coalition forces and population.  
1.  Force Structure and Command and Control 
For better results in unconventional fighting, many experts agree that the system 
of command and control should be simple, informal, flexible and decentralized. 
Orders and plans are as brief and simple as possible, relying on 
subordinates to effect the necessary coordination and on the human 
capacity for implicit communication based on a mutual understanding of 
requirements. By decentralizing decision-making authority, mission and 
control seeks to improve the ability to deal with fluid and localized 
situation.118 
The force should have a flat type of organization with reduced layers of 
command. 
The organization of a military force should reflect the conceptual 
organization of the plan. In other words, organization should dictate the 
chain of command as well as the command and support relationship within 
the force. Similarly, organization should ensure that a commander has 
authority over or access to all the resources required accomplishing the 
assigned mission.119 
As described in previous chapter, the logical algorithm for organizational design 
of the force necessary to implement the unconventional approach should follow the steps: 
identifying the solution, elaborating the concept of operations, and then, task-organize the 
force. Further, by decentralizing the command and control, the tactical commanders are 
empowered with the necessary authority and initiative in order to rapidly react to and 
engage the insurgents.  
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Delegating authority to subordinates does not absolve higher commanders 
of ultimate responsibility. Consequently , they must frame their guidance 
in such a way that subordinates are provided sufficient understanding to 
act in accordance with their desires while not restricting freedom of action. 
Commanders must be adept at expressing their desires clearly and 
forcefully.120 
Only a flexible dynamic structure of force can counter the actions of a 
decentralized network. In this equation conventional forces still playing the support and 
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) role. Nevertheless, SOF should have a multiplication role of 
the constabulary counterinsurgent local force (political leadership, intelligence 
community, police forces, ISF, Iraqi Army and neighborhood militia).   
We should take a flexible approach to organization, maintaining the 
capability to organize forces to suit the situation that might include the 
creation of nonstandard and temporary task forces. By organizing into self 
–reliant groups, we increase each commander’s freedom of action and in 
the same time decrease the need for centralized coordination of support. 
We also reduce synchronization across an extended battlefield. 
Commanders should have the flexibility to eliminate or bypass selected 
echelons of command or staff as appropriate in order to improve 
operational results.121 
D.  OBJECTIVES; CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS; FORCE STRUCTURE; 
COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Today SOF in Iraq assist to a larger conventional campaign, where different 
strongholds are guarded by conventional forces and from where aggressive patrol or 
sweep up operations are launched on a regular basis, in order to disrupt the 
insurgent/terrorist networks. 
The new concept implies an unconventional approach resulting in a permanent 
distribution of SOF on the disputed areas, playing a multiplication role of 
counterinsurgent surrogate force, in order to establish the security and control over the 
population. 
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The unconventional approach in any counterinsurgency can be translated at 
Strategic and Operational levels as follows: Combating insurgency can not be achieved 
only by holding the vital points with large mechanized regular forces. If the space is 
permissible for insurgents and the bridge between state forces and population is broken, 
the both control and security are at peril in the long run. Attacking insurgent networks 
should start from the source, denying insurgents contact with local population by 
reinforcing an active presence, working closely with local forces and employ constructive 
programs for the benefit of population.122 
In stating this view, Dr. McCormick is describing the following geospatial 
characteristics: for a distributed problem requires a distributed solution; state forces 
should operate continuously and not discreetly (partially); all politics are local; the 
counterinsurgency implementation by, with, and through the population it is a 
multilateral challenge requiring a multilateral solution. 
Furthermore, Dr. McCormick suggests that SOF should be integrated in a broader 
concept were the area of operation is divided between tactical commanders, each 
retaining full autonomy and authority in their specific area. Hence the JSOTFC should 
delegate the authority to the tactical level, centralizing intelligence products and 
distributing them back to all tactical levels, providing the logistic support, quick reaction 
force and fire support assets. In a multilateral environment the joint campaign should 
integrate information and psychological operations, and civil affairs, to serve a larger 
goal of positively influencing the population behavior.  
Allied military forces and advisory teams, organized to support police 
forces and fight insurgents, can bolster security until indigenous security 
forces are competent to perform these tasks without allied assistance. In 
the U.S. Armed Forces, only the Special Forces (SF) are expressly 
organized and trained for counterinsurgency warfare and advising 
indigenous forces.123 
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Therefore, the strategy in Iraq should prioritize the strategic objectives in the 
following sequence: control and security over the population; acquiring actionable 
intelligence on insurgency infrastructure - create a centralized data base network should 
be in place allowing instant access of any independent detachment/team through secure 
lines and procedures; disrupting the insurgent infrastructure in order to deny the 
insurgent/terrorist mobility, and isolate insurgents from population; civic actions and 
social programs. 
Indeed, first among the six counterinsurgency principles defined by British 
doctrine is the “Political Primacy and Political Aim” followed by:  
- Coordinated government Machinery 
- Intelligence and Information 
- Separating the Insurgent from this Support 
- Neutralizing the Insurgent 
- Longer term Post-Insurgency Planning.124 
1.  Implementation at Operational and Tactical Levels 
Special Operational Forces Detachments (SOF Operational Detachments Alfa or 
Bravo) are qualifying as the most appropriate structure in the Army in order to cope with 
unconventional warfare. The reasons for this are worth mentioning the following: 
collective skills, cost effective, multiplication role, and cultural awareness and 
experience, and language abilities. 
Identification of operators, leadership, and infrastructure across the 
spectrum of terrorist networks requires an integrated and adaptive blue 
force network. Special Operators will remain essential in this role while 
they continue to develop indigenous capabilities to fight terrorists and 
rogue regimes. By positioning and networking SOF in key locations to 
obtain and disseminate information, supported by specialized equipment 
and advanced technologies.125 
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The enemy is evolving faster than the actual CONOPS because of the 
bureaucratic drift, or conventional thinking and answer at every requirement or request 
from the lowest chain of command.126 
Our adversary therefore had considerable success in shaping and 
influencing the perceptions of the Iraqi public in its favor. The ponderous 
way in which centrally managed PSYOP products were developed, vetted, 
and approved through bureaucratic channels meant they were simply not 
being produced quickly enough to do any good. Just as important, they 
were not being tailored precisely enough to influence our diverse 
audiences' opinions about breaking events.127 
Only such new created by SOF and surrogate indigenous forces in a network type 
organization can be flexible enough to react timely, correspondently and effectively to 
the insurgents outputs.  
Another important issue in counterinsurgency practice for the state is to deny the 
freedom of maneuver of insurgents by filling out the entire spectrum of political space.  
The solution is to empower the lowest levels of the military in phase 2 of 
the operations. Empower the captains who are the unit/squad commanders 
as the local decision makers and hold them responsible. This means the 
top leadership cannot enter the picture in that local community without the 
permission of the local commanders. This is a SF function, supported by 
the Army conventional. The elements of the conventional force should be 
broken down to support the SF teams. Each AO commander must 
maintain a continuous contact with the commanders contiguous to them, 
in order to avoid (deny) the enemy the ability (opportunity) to infiltrate 
between the spaces. There must be no space but continuity between each 
area of operation. Let the commander of the area of operation be the king 
of the area of operation.128 
The only centralized area regarding the command and control should cover the 
intelligence, logistic and fire support aspects. A robust QRF with air capabilities should 
be positioned and cover a central area in order to respond timely to different critical 
situation.  
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Emergency conditions dictate that government needs a single, fully 
empowered executive to direct and coordinate counterinsurgency efforts. 
Power-sharing among political bodies, while appropriate and necessary in 
peace times, presents wartime vulnerabilities and gaps in coordination that 
insurgents can exploit.129  
Further, Professor McCormick explains the relations between the force and its 
commander, relations which should not undermine the achievement of the strategic 
objective. 
When the problem arises, the associated QRF must fall in under the AO 
commander control, to solve the issue. The JTF commander should be 
roaming the area of operations AOs to ensure that the empowered captains 
are getting what they need, when they need. The JTF commander should 
be the single person in charge in AO, responsible for all, and everyone 
should answer to him. Because the unity of command is crucial, he should 
have total and ultimate control. All others are there to support him.130 
Among the measures designed to control the space in Area of operations, one can 
include restrictive and identification procedures, such as the mandatory magnetic 
identification card for all inhabitants. Additionally to magnetic code, photo, fingerprint, 
and other security measures should be added to these cards for two reasons: fist to deny 
the illegal reproduction and second to allow tactical commanders to check the card 
through a portable tactical devise tied to the database.  
Important individual data should comprise, at a minimum, name, 
photograph, biographical data, distinguishing characteristics, educations, 
current and former employment, address and phone numbers, record of 
foreign travel and military service, family member’s tribal affiliation, 
ethnic and religious affiliation.131 
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Enabling ground commanders to access data about any suspect leads gradually to 
a restriction of movement of insurgents and supporters. This measure, integrated in a 
complex control package, along with curfews, random road-blocks and check-points, 
vehicle restricted areas, and HUMINT operations, should also help holding the cleared 
area.  
Constant patrolling by government forces establishes an official presence 
that enhances security and builds confidence in the government. Patrolling 
is a basic tenet of policing, and in the last 100 years all successful 
counterinsurgencies have employed this fundamental security policy.132  
Once the curfew has been imposed, specially trained units should begin 
exhaustive systematic search and clear operations, block by block, 
building by building. The host nation element of the clearing and 
consolidation force should conduct an aggressive information operation 
campaign to tell the populace how the operations is design to improve 
their security and quality of life; to request their tolerance of this 
temporary, yet necessary, inconvenience; and to solicit their active 
support.133 
One common mistake at tactical and operational level is intelligence gathering. 
Although in conventional operation the advanced intelligence party provides essential 
data about the enemy, in counterinsurgency operations the collection of data becomes 
effective only after the state/coalition are establishing the full control on respective area. 
That why, the following approach is ineffective:  
Clearing operations should be preceded by an intense intelligence 
gathering campaign in the target city or area. The campaign will identify 
insurgents, insurgents’ sympathizers and government supporters. 
Intelligence gatherers will compile black and white lists to identify known 
insurgents and insurgents’ sympathizers.134 
Only after creating the critical bounds with the population and local forces, this 
flexible and highly mobile structure should exploit the resulted actionable intelligence 
and disseminate critical intelligence products through integrated system. 
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Putting intelligence dominance into practice to gain control of territory 
plagued by armed groups means the integration of the collection, analysis, 
covert action, and counterintelligence instruments – to maximize 
effectiveness against targets.135 
E.  CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this thesis enable the reader to understand the possible outcomes 
between the conventional approach and unconventional approach to 
asymmetrical/irregular conflicts. Furthermore, by identifying the feasible profile of a 
military structure designed to counter the insurgency the state can also design the 
strategic steps to control and secure the population. 
At an organizational level, optimal force structure will ensure for deployed forces 
to have the requisite capabilities for operating in the unique (unconventional) 
counterinsurgency or counterterrorist environment. Without these capabilities and skills, 
the doctrinal, training, and technological improvements are wasted.  
History shows us that the transition from conventional thinking to unconventional 
can not be done over night. Modern armies having in their doctrine incorporated the 
preemptive and preventive strategy will be forced eventually to develop another type of 
military force in order to deal with low intensity conflict environment, a constant source 
of instability in today’s World.  
McCormick’s Mystic Diamond is a feasible model, which correctly applied, can 
bring stability to a troubled area. In order to be implemented the model has to be 
acknowledged and understood by operators and leaders.   
In Iraq, a pure conventional approach has no long lasting results, because is not 
able to deal properly with eliminating the sources of violence and instability. Therefore, 
instead of asking the conventional military forces to adapt and deal with threats for which  
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they were not created and prepared to address, the politico-military leadership should 
consider using SOF, as the combatant structure specially designed and trained to manage 
irregular conflicts, respective the Iraqi one.  
Furthermore, the politico-military leadership should envision the creation of a 
constabulary type of force/structure consisting in SOF, CA, PSYOPS, ISF, Iraqi police 
forces, political authorities, local protection or security forces, and doctrinally adapted to 
deal with and eliminate the asymmetric threat. In advance this surrogate structure should 
be able to fight in unconventional environment and to fulfill the task of stabilizing a 
country or a region for a long lasting term. 
Resurrecting a UW capability will require a real change in thinking, at the 
national policy level, within Department of Defense and in the SOF 
community. At the highest levels, it will require a change in strategic 
thinking and policymaking to accept UW as an important arena that is not 
peripheral to national interest, but is one that can add significantly to our 
security.136 
Facing the perspective of a withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq it might be an 
error to display confidence in any type of strategy, conventional or unconventional. 
Nevertheless, the Mystic Diamond Model provides a feasible modus on operand for SOF 
community and clears the conceptual fog of insurgency chaos. The unity of effort should 
be persuaded with determinacy on all aspects of strategy objectives (ends), concepts 
(ways) and resources (means). The Mystic Diamond Model acknowledges the importance 
of creating the national consensus and reconciliation as the bases for a long term solution. 
Besides political consensus, economic reconstruction of the country, and the necessary 
improvement of Iraqi people condition of leaving create an environment which becomes 
difficult to be further penetrated by the destabilizing forces as a synergic condition. 
Similar with the Vietnam War, it can be asserted that irrespective of potential 
outcome of the Iraqi conflict, at least on the military field, it should be a new 
revolutionary wave. This revolutionary wave should encompass valuable lessons learned 
not only at tactical and operational levels but also at the strategic one. A careful analysis 
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of those lessons learned could bring to the surface at least the value of theoretical 
framework of Mystic Diamond Model, as the unconventional strategic option developed 
through historical considerations of all successful counterinsurgencies practices, methods 
and techniques. 
It is still possible for Iraq and coalition governments to adopt a proven 
counterinsurgencies practices and abandon schemes that have no record of 
success. Any campaign plan to prosecute the counterinsurgency in Iraq 
should be submitted to a test of historical feasibility in addition to 
customary methods of analysis.137 
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